Introduction

This paper deals with the question of transformation of social policy in Central and Eastern Europe after the breakthrough of 1989. The introduction of market economies and democratization process in Central Europe have been accompanied by significant changes in social policy programs. The transformation has brought about risks typical for market economies (such as unemployment) that had stood in contrast with an institutional framework inherited from the socialist past (or lack of it at all). Therefore, a potential scope of social policy has been expanded. Also, the transition significantly changed the structure (by reducing the role of state owned enterprises) and logic (introduction of mechanisms meant to fit to the requirements of a market economy) of social policy provision. Exposed to various factors, both domestic and external (foreign advisors, the EU membership), the countries of the region, even though commonly perceived as the monolith, accommodated differently to this situation.

This issue raises a number of questions: how social policies changed since 1989, and whether one may distinguish some patterns of this change: evolutionary or rapid; divergence/convergence; consolidation of social policies in the region. To answer these, the
paper is guided by the two more precise questions: 1) what were the institutional features of social policy in the period 1989-2004? and 2) whether one can talk of more stable patterns and/or consolidation of them? This paper looks at the main institutional characteristics of three social policy areas: unemployment benefits, family policy (maternity and parental leave and benefits, childcare) and pensions in the group of eight countries, which joined the European Union in 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The inclusion of such period allows for observing how the policies evolved, were being created and changed in the light of significant transformations taking place in the region. Therefore, one may argue about possible (dis)similarities in the beginning of this process and variety of responses to similar pressures (the EU integration) for instance.

Beside the substantive interest in studying the three social policy areas, there is also analytical significance of this choice. First, on the most general level, the paper refers to the debate concerning the nature of institutional change/stability. Up to recently, analyses of social policy, driven by the concept of path dependency, emphasized institutional stability (Pierson 2001). A careful comparison of social policies of CEE may serve as the basis for more nuance analysis: which policies change, how, can we talk about some intra-country (or policy) logic. This paper demonstrates that in the context of unprecedented political and economic change some policies have been changed significantly, others represent cases of stability.

Next to the previous point, such analysis can provide one with hints concerning the presence of social policy institutional logic in a given country. This paper looks at the relation between institutional logics of social policy programmes expressed by the principles guiding eligibility, generosity and quality or relations among state and market. If one underlying logic would be the case, it is interesting to check, whether there exists one ‘post-communist’ model of social policy, as suggested by the ‘monolith’ thesis, or the region of Central Europe can be characterised by an internal divergence.

First, the possible diversity among such number of countries has never been studied before to such extent. Second, in order to overcome the problem of instability of the policy outcomes, the analysis attempts at presenting synchronic and diachronic perspectives simultaneously. Thus, it is possible to present the dynamics of changes, policy trends and the diversity among the countries. Third, the comparison is made systematic, with using the fuzzy-set method, and this way specified the difference more precisely. In other words, the great emphasis is placed on the method of comparison
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it briefly introduces ideal types fuzzy sets approach. Following sections are devoted to the analysis of three social policy areas: pensions, unemployment compensation and childcare policy. The paper describes social policy trends, both of each policy and across them. Final section summarises finding of the paper.

**Fuzzy set ideal-types analysis**

As demonstrated by some scholars (Janoski and Hicks 1994; Rihoux and Grimm 2006), a fruitful comparative research on welfare state policies should be sensitive to the variation among cases and driven by clear conceptual and theoretical guidelines. Usually, this means a case-oriented approach, emphasizing the analytical complexity policy (Ragin 1987). However, meeting this requirement usually means reducing the number of cases at hand as there exist limited possibilities of application of ‘thick’, comprehensive description to an extended number of cases.

One of successful ways of minimizing this problem, the fuzzy set theory has been proposed by Charles Ragin. This paper utilizes the extension of this approach, namely fuzzy set ideal-types analysis. Based on the fuzzy-set theory it allows for a comparison of bigger number of cases without loosing an emphasis on the complexity of childcare policy. As shown by Jon Kvist (1999; 2006), this type of comparative analysis can be successfully used for studying diversity and change of social policy. The most straightforward benefit of using this method is that it allows for more nuance account of change, which of a great relevance, given the unstable context of policy-making in CEE. The features of this approach are presented below.

First, the approach introduces the notion of fuzzy set. Fuzzy set is a representation of an empirical phenomenon, which is guided by rules stemming from theoretical and substantive knowledge. Therefore, fuzzy sets should not be seen as conventional variables: they are neither binary variables, nor any other type, as they comprise qualitative anchors (defining boundaries of a set), which affect the membership assessment. Thus, fuzzy sets are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative, as they include the qualitative boundaries and quantitative variation within them (usually fuzzy set ranges from 0 to 1 and these values - with 0.5 as a cross-over point - constitute qualitative boundaries, ). The qualitative anchors are established in the process of calibration. For example, a theoretical concept of unemployment compensation generosity quality is operationalised by the replacement rate of a benefit. The set of generosity is then calibrated according to some theoretical premises (concerning
financial needs of unemployed, etc) and empirical knowledge (some systems of unemployment compensation identified previously as being generous). In this sense, fuzzy set may have different degree of membership – therefore, one can talk about different fuzzy set values. In effect, every case is viewed as belonging to pre-defined aspects (and varying with respect to this membership).

Second, the fundamental assumption of the fuzzy set approach is that empirical phenomena have a complex character. This configurational character stems from the presumption that theoretical constructs can rarely be described by one aspect (characteristic), and only multidimensional treatment of cases can provide their sufficient reflection in a process of research. For example, when comparing unemployment compensation, one should take into account at least, eligibility criteria defining access to a benefit and its generosity. These two dimensions represent here the constituting aspects of a given phenomena (here: unemployment compensation), i.e. fuzzy sets. This is why in order to catch this complexity it is reasonable to point out their constituting aspects and to think about them as configurations (set intersections). In effect, every case is viewed as belonging to pre-defined aspects (and varying in the respect to this membership).

Finally, the fuzzy set approach puts emphasis on the importance of interplay of ideas (theory) and evidence. This centrality of theoretical and substantive knowledge results in precise definition of relevant aspects (sets), their calibration but also the reduction of a set’s variation (as not all variation is meaningful from a theoretical point of view).

The importance of the fuzzy set theory here is at least twofold. As mentioned the approach is sensitive to qualitative (difference in kind) and quantitative (difference in degree) character of analysed phenomena simultaneously, which in turn might be a first step towards creating typologies (ibid). Second, the fuzzy sets approach can be successfully used for assessing conformity of cases to ideal types. If one treats boundaries of combinations of sets (so-called crisply defined property-space locations) as the ideal types, the operations on sets can be used for establishing a relation between cases and theoretically constructed ideal types. These two aspects, combined with methodological and conceptual transparency, create the background for comparative analysis, satisfying requirements of both, the measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001) and precise location of cases in conceptual space defined by the researcher.

There are some rules which govern the fuzzy sets and their interpretation. The operations used in this analysis are: negation and logical and. As far as the negation is concerned, the point is that the fuzzy membership of a case in set not-A is equal to 1- set A
(or in more formal form: $a_n = 1 - A_n$; where small $a$ stands for the negation of the set $A$, $A$ for the set and $n$ is the $n$th case) (Ragin 2000: 172). The negation this way shows that thinking in bipolar categories strongly constrains the analysis. At the same time, the negation is a very useful tool, as it allows for conclusion that, for example, if some childcare policy membership in the set of generosity is 0.6, than this case scores 0.4 in the set of non-generosity (cf. Kvist 1999).

Logical \textit{and} is used when two or more sets are intersected. It is the minimum rule which governs this operation in the case of fuzzy sets. It means that the membership value of such sets is equal to the lowest score achieved by any of them. Thus, if one has sets $A \ast B$ (the sign $\ast$ stands for \textit{and}), and the case scores 0.6 and 0.8 respectively, the membership of this case in sets $A \ast B$ is 0.6 (Ragin 2000: 173).

These operations on fuzzy sets allow for proper and fast assessment of the cases’ membership assessment in a complex combination of sets. This is done by the evaluation of a membership degree in the crisply defined property-space locations, that is, logically possible combinations of full membership and non-membership in the sets which create the property space. Logically, the number of crisply defined property-space locations equals to $2^k$ where $k$ stands for a number of dimensions. The idea of comparison is to contrast empirical evidence with each combination representing an ideal type and find the instance with the highest membership. It should be noted, however, especially in social science, one may encounter the so called limited diversity (Ragin 1987, 2000). It is probable that ideal types may not find their empirical counterparts because there can be contradictory or impossible configurations of the aspects constituting social phenomena.

\textit{Data}

This paper utilizes a variety of data sources. The study covers the period 1989-2004, which poses serious problems as far as the information concerning social policy changes is concerned. It uses the US Social Security Administration’s \textit{Social Security Programs Throughout the World} publications from years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2004, published in co-operation with the International Social Security Association. Certainly, the data coming from the SSA have limitations: even though it covers the whole period, one may encounter the vague information included there (Clegg and Clasen 2003). However, this is the only source, which contains the information concerning chosen eight countries for such a long period. Unfortunately, the data from this source is very inconsistent and it has to be checked in other sources coming from the ILO, EU, OECD COE and World Bank publications. Whenever possible, the data are supported by the information coming from other
sources, such as MISSCEEC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Central and Eastern European Countries), MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union) and MISSCEO (Mutual Information System on Social Protection of the Council of Europe).

**Old-age pensions**

Old age pensions constitute first social policy programme, which is analysed in this paper. Stanisława Golinowska stresses that ‘[t]he pension debate became major issue in transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe’ (Golinowska 1999: 172). As Joan Nelson adds, these reforms consisted of at least two steps: first, pension systems were adjusted to changing economic and social conditions, and second, there were attempts to conduct more profound reform (Ksiezopolski 1999; Mueller 1999; Nelson 2001). This section examines these changes.

For the purpose of the comparison, the following dimensions of post-socialist pension systems are proposed: universality, generosity and the role of private schemes.

Generosity of the pension benefits shows how the relation between received pension and the prior salary is designed. If pensions are generous, it means that the average level of the pension received during the retirement period (whether this is after the period of work or childbearing is the subject of other dimension) is high compared to the average salary level. This aspect is raised in almost every discussion on comparative welfare state research. For the purpose of this paper, the replacement rate is used as an indicator of generosity. The replacement rate reflects an average percentage of the previous income compared with the median salary in the economy.

One crucial aspect of social policy reform analysis is the time dimension - for many reasons the effects of reform are usually delayed. This seems especially crucial in the case of pension reform, where a new scheme (institutional structure) is already in place, but the payment of benefits is a matter of future. Nevertheless, as Pierson (1994) suggests, this situation should not imply the change did not occur. To account for this problem, this paper treats the reform as it had been implemented fully. In this particular case it means that the replacement rate will represent a simulated value for the new system for a person with a standardised earnings career.

The qualitative anchors are established as follows. The lower one is established at the level of 40 percent. This level is connected with the poverty line measured as the percentage of average salary (the World Bank and OECD). While it is assumed that the presented level
lies below the poverty line, at the same time one has to take into consideration the fact, that elderly do not have to finance their dependants so extensively (Golinowska 1997). Thus, this lower level seems justified. Additionally, this level of benefit is recalled by the International Labour Organisation and other international bodies as the minimum standard (Fultz 2002). As far as the cross-over point is concerned, it is established at the level of 60 percent of the average earnings. Finally, the upper level is established at the level of 75 percent of the previous salary (Cerami 2003). These two points were recognised as important qualitative indicators of the situation of the elderly in Central and Eastern Europe (ibid.).

The universality of the old-age pensions relates to the way benefits are targeted. It takes into account whether the whole population is covered by the provision or pensions are aimed at some special groups (e.g. those who pay contributions or fulfil special criteria). One might say that if the access to the benefits does not require special conditions, then the programme is fully universal. However, this situation is purely theoretical, because even in Scandinavian countries, perceived as most universal (via the scope of social rights), one has to meet the criterion of residence or citizenship (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, the condition of citizenship or residence still should be perceived as the emanation of universal provision. In the literature there is a discussion about universality: it is said that both the liberal and social democratic regimes provide universal pensions (Clasen and van-Oorshot 2002; Clegg and Clasen 2003). However, this applies only to the general rule: in both regimes basic pensions are financed through taxes, but the eligibility criteria are significantly different. While in the case of liberal regime there is the condition of passing the means- (income) test, in the social democratic one, only requirement of the citizenship or residence is in power.

Similar approach is proposed here: it takes into account the coverage and the conditions that are to be met by the person eligible for the benefit, as the basis of the universality assessment. In other words, it is analysed which social groups are eligible for the old-age benefit and which situations are taken into account as the basis of the entitlement. The upper qualitative point is set for the situation where every citizen is entitled to some basic benefit and the access to it is not conditional (basic pension, financed through taxes for example). The lower cut-off point is characterised by the benefit which is provided by the state, but it is means- (income) tested. Finally, the cross-over point should reflect the situation where there is a clear link between minimum pension and contribution. Thus, in effect one has a triad of welfare provision: it can be universal (fully in), contributory (cross-over) and finally selective (fully out) (cf. Kvist 1999). These three clusters were divided into smaller parts in
order to allow for more fine-grained analysis (there are two for selectivity and two for universality).

The final element of the old-age pensions analysed here is the public-private mix. It focuses on the locus of pensions provision, whether it is done by the state or market (private companies). The market provided, funded element of a pension system reduces government expenditures related to the programme in the long run (Atkinson 1999). But at the same time it reduces the possibility of the state’s involvement with respect to redistribution (Baldwin 1990). Such a change is of a fundamental importance, because as Fultz puts it this arrangement effectively shifts risk from society at large to individual workers and shifts the role of government from that of benefit provider to that of regulator vis-à-vis the firms that make up the private tier (Fultz 2006).

Usually, the private component of old-age pensions is measured as the share of private pensions in total social expenditure. While this type of measure has some merits, one of biggest drawbacks lies in the fact current spending does not reflect a reform whose effects are usually delayed. To solve this problem, the paper proposes to measure the role of the private provision as the share of future pensioners’ contribution, which is transferred to private funds. This approach should allow for catching the shift (even partial) in the public/private mix. The qualitative anchors are established as follows: the lower point the 3 percent of contribution going to the private scheme, the cross-over at 15, the upper one at 50 percent. Table 1 below presents the aspects of the comparison and their translation into indicators, fuzzy score ranges and verbal qualifiers.

Table 1: Specification of empirical indicators and translation of data to fuzzy score ranges and verbal qualifiers: old-age pensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical indicator</th>
<th>Fully out</th>
<th>Mostly but not full out</th>
<th>More or less fully out</th>
<th>Neither in nor out</th>
<th>More or less in</th>
<th>Mostly but not fully in</th>
<th>Fully in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universality of the minimum old-age benefits measured by the rules guiding access</td>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Contribution rule</td>
<td>Universality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity measured as replacement rate</td>
<td>&lt;40%</td>
<td>40.1-50</td>
<td>50.1-59.9</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60.1-68</td>
<td>68.1-74.9</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private provision of benefits measured as the percentage of the contribution devoted to private mandatory scheme</td>
<td>&lt;3%</td>
<td>3.1-7</td>
<td>7.1-14.9</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15.1-20</td>
<td>20.1-50</td>
<td>&gt;50.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emerging patterns of old-age pensions in CEE

Analysing changes with regard to particular dimensions of comparison is helpful for grasping the practical side of reforms. However, the main goal of this paper is the
configurational analysis. For this purpose the three dimensions of the old-age pensions policy are taken into account. This gives 8 possible combinations. A membership of each combination of sets is assessed and the highest value is chosen.\(^1\) The table below presents only the highest scores of the pensions dimensions for each country in selected years. It should be noticed that whenever the paper refers to Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (period 1989-91) these countries were the republics of the Soviet Union. The same applies to the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia 1989-1993), as well as to Slovenia (Yugoslavia 1989-1991). Beneath is the summary of the findings concerning old-age pension policy. As mentioned above, the results of simulations are used for reforms delayed in time. The combinations of dimensions including such simulations are presented in italics.

Generally, in the analysed period (1989-2004), pension policy in Central and Eastern Europe was marked by many changes of various nature. Some countries opted out for a change of system parameters without changing fundamental institutional structure. Other countries decided to shift to a completely different system. The latter cases, consisting of countries reforming their PAYG systems, are the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The second group, reformed their pensions more profoundly, by shifting to a multipillar system, with PAYG system either reformed or replaced as a first pillar, accompanied by a mandatory funded second pillar. The characteristics of pensions and their changes are presented in the table below.

Table 2: Fuzzy membership scores of old-age pensions in ideal types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>u·G·p  (0.55)</td>
<td>u·G·p (0.7)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.58)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.58)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.53)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.53)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.5)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.7)</td>
<td>u·g·P (0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.53)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.5)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.52)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.75)</td>
<td>u·G·P (0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.5)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.72)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.55)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>u·g·P (0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.75)</td>
<td>u·g·p (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.55)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.58)</td>
<td>u·G·P (0.75)</td>
<td>u·G·P (0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>u·G·p (0.55)</td>
<td>u·G·p (0.7)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.53)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.54)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.51)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.51)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·g·p (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
<td>U·G·p (0.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table should be read as follows. Combinations of letters illustrate the policy type, while the number in parentheses describe conformity to the ideal type (the higher the number, the closer the combination is to the ideal type). For example, Hungarian policy in 1989 belonged to the type U·G·p, which, in plain English, means that the policy was characterized by high universality (U) and generosity (G) of pensions without involvement of private sector (p). The high number reflects close conformity of the policy to this ideal type. As mentioned above, the fuzzy sets approach is sensitive to two modes of change – from one type to another (difference in kind), and change in the conformity to the ideal type (difference in degree). The latter can be illustrated by the change of score for the same combination while the previous takes place when policy shifts to a different type (as represented by another combination). From the methodological and theoretical point of view, the shift in one dimension (from low to high universality), results in a change of policy type.

As far as the Czech old pensions are concerned, several but small changes took place, but generally the fundamental shift did not occur. Accordingly, in the initial period, the benefits were moderately accessible, quite generous and managed and controlled by the state (u·G·p). The generosity of benefits declined in the following period, which resulted in the change to another combination (u·g·p). Final years before joining the EU were characterized by more accessible benefits, but still not generous. The private provision of benefits was absent for the whole period and it is the state which took care of system management. It is worth noting that the shifts until 2002 result from the ambiguous score of generosity. Therefore it seems legitimate to label the pensions as moderately generous and universal and then from 2002 as moderately generous and accessible.

Lithuania is a second country pursuing rather stable policy in the analysed period. Except for 2004, the system was characterised by high universality of minimum pensions, low generosity and lack of involvement of a private sector in mandatory system (U·g·p). In 2004 the access to a minimum pension become stricter and thus the shift to u·g·p.

Another country with relatively stable old-age pension system is Slovakia. From 1989 to 1991 the policy was the same as in the Czech Republic (moderately accessible, quite generous and managed and controlled by the state, u·G·p). From 1993 on (except for 1997), Slovakia followed its own path, with easily accessible minimum benefit, not generous average pensions and the lack of private sector involvement (U·G·p). As was the case of the Czech Republic, the scores of generosity revolve around the cross-over point which affects the overall score of the policy. Taking this ambiguity into account, pension policy of Slovakia can be characterised as of highly universal, moderately generous, with no state involvement.
The last country in the group of ‘modest’ reformers is Slovenia. Interestingly, pension policy of Slovenia remained stable in the whole period (U·G·p). The minimum pensions were quite accessible, the benefits were generous and no private sector was involved.

Estonia is the example of a more profound reform. In the beginning of the transformation, the pension system inherited from the Soviet Union was slightly changed by loosing access to a minimum benefit. The system of accessible and generous pensions (U·G·p) continues to exist, however a reform has been introduced. The analysis shows that the reform will result in a significant restricting access to minimum pensions, the generosity will drop even further and a part of a benefit will be provided by private insurance companies (u·g·P). In analytical categories it means serious departure from the previous system: partial withdrawal of the state, individualisation of responsibility and increased role of the market solutions in the pension system.

Hungarian pension policy is the case of an encompassing change as well. While the policy remained quite stable from 1989 to 1999, the introduction of a multipillar system marks the difference. Accordingly, in the first period, the policy features were high accessibility, moderate generosity and lack of mandatory private pension (U·G·p). The reform made the rules of access stricter and introduced private, mandatory component of pensions. The generosity, according to simulations, is expected to rise. Therefore, the policy reflects the combination (u·G·P).

Third Baltic country, Latvia took its own path. From the very beginning minimum pensions were hardly accessible, the level of an average benefit was low and no private sector was involved in the mandatory system (u·g·p). This situation lasted until the reform, when a new, multipillar system has been introduced. After the reform, pensions will still be hardly accessible, even less generous and partially delivered by a private sector (u·g·P). As is the case of other countries which opted out for the multipillar system, this reform should be considered as a significant change.

Finally, when it comes to Poland, the features of the pension system are following. First, the pensions were easily accessible, moderately generous and without involvement of a private sector (U·g·p). This situation lasted until 1999, when a new, multipillar system has been introduced. The new system will have stricter rules concerning accessibility, the simulated replacement rates suggest low generosity, and the contributions are managed partially by private insurance companies (u·g·P). Such a change, therefore, is a departure from the system which was present in the 1990s.
To conclude this part of the analysis, some more general remarks appear. First, diversity of paths is striking. There was no one leading pattern of pension stability/change in the region. Generally, in the first phase of the transformation, the changes were not encompassing, rather included modification of single parameters. Later on, some countries decided the change the system within already existing frames by the further parametric changes. It usually meant changes in the PAYG systems, concerning the rules of accessibility and benefits’ generosity. Other countries decided to replace their systems with a new structure. This took place in the end of the 1990s and later.

It should be noted that pension systems in the 1990s demonstrated variety of types. Similar patterns may be observed in the cases of the Czech Republic and Latvia (u·g·p); Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia (U·g·p); and Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (U·G·p). However, within the analysed timeframes, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland went for a partial privatisation of their mandatory programs, accompanied by decreasing generosity of benefits (as indicated by the simulations) and stricter access to minimum pensions.

Inclusion of the simulated future replacement rates and focusing on the contributions’ public/private split allows for long-term perspective. This way, it is possible to demonstrate delayed effects of the reforms which otherwise would be omitted, as at the moment new pensions are being phased in. The approach used here shows a great shift in the features of the system and suggests that in the cases of Latvia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland one should not talk anymore about the stability of their pension policies. These four countries go in a similar direction of partial privatisation, individualisation and marketisation. These changes are accompanied by a partial withdrawal of the state from pension’s management and provision and the move towards more residual function of control.

This analysis suggests there were two phases of pension programmes’ reform. The first one involved parametric adjustments in all the countries, without changing fundamental features of pension systems. In the second phase some countries continued parametric change, while others opted for more profound, paradigmatic changes. Therefore, one should talk about the variety of emerging pension systems in the region, characterised by both, continuity and change.

**Analysis of unemployment compensation**

The aim of this section is to provide an overview of unemployment compensation in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, it presents institutional dimensions of this

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1 This part is based on Polakowski and Szelewa 2007
policy. Next, it demonstrates how these dimensions are operationalised and their empirical values are transformed into fuzzy scores. Final part deals with a configurational analysis of the policy: it shows to which ideal policy types unemployment compensation belonged, and how this membership changed over time and across countries. This, in turn, allows for studying diversity, convergence/divergence and consolidation of unemployment compensation policy.

For the purpose of the comparison, four dimensions of labour market policy are taken into account. The aspects of unemployment compensation policy are: accessibility and generosity of unemployment compensation, its duration and obligations concerning the claimants. It should be noted that this selection does not leave aside important conceptual trade-offs. Such issues as functional equivalence and existence of programs which follow the basic unemployment compensation are the subject of necessary simplification. However, this paper aims more at describing (changing) patterns, reflecting the policy choices of states, rather then detailed content of each single policy. For this purpose, the selected dimensions seem most appropriate. As they will be transformed into sets and then analysed configurationally, they are briefly outlined below.

The accessibility is operationalised through the ratio of time necessary to qualify to the period of reference (Clasen 2001; Kvist 2003). The inclusion of groups other than workers will move the score towards higher level of accessibility. Thus, the more groups are eligible for the unemployment benefit and the condition of previous work is loosened, the more accessible the unemployment compensation. The cross-over point is established for the ratio 0.5 (for example 6 months of work within 12 months or 2 years within 4 years of reference period). The higher qualitative point refers to the situation where the ratio equals to 0.25. The lower qualitative point is established when the ratio equals 1. The scores are modified, when other activities than work are sufficient to qualify (when military service, child care and attending school are taken into account). Table shows approximate distribution of the categories.

As far as the generosity is concerned, the lower cut-off point (fully out) is set at the level of 30 percent. It has been argued that the level of salaries in the region is generally low as, for example in the case of Poland the relation between the survival minimum (based on the basket of minimum needs) and the average salary is approx. 25% and the relation with socially desirable needs—the social minimum—is around 50% (Kurowski 2002). For others countries of the region, these ratios vary, however, the relation is rather robust (ILO 1995; Vaughan-Whitehead 1995; Cerami 2003). Therefore, this qualitative anchor takes a middle
ground. When it comes to two other qualitative anchors, the cross-over (neither in, nor out) point is established at 45% of the average income, while the higher cut-off point (fully in) is set at 60% of the average wage.

The calibration of the duration set is done as follows. The cross-over point is set for the period of 9 months. This level refers approximately to the duration of benefit in the OECD countries pursuing the modest policy in this respect. The lower cut-off point, for 3 months while the higher qualitative anchor for period of 18 months. Comparatively, the previous value is typical for residual policy types, while the latter for those more comprehensive in the OECD (Riboud, Sánchez-Páramo et al. 2002). Table 1 presents in more detail the way the dimension of duration is translated into fuzzy set value ranges.

The final dimension of analysis covers the obligations of unemployed persons who receive a benefit. The paper studies the severity of sanctions stated in formal rules governing suspension of a benefit in case of a job offer and/or training refusal. The severity of benefit suspension is based on the number of refusals leading to it. This is accompanied by the possibility of renewal of benefit eligibility. For example, the sanctions are more acute in the case of one refusal than one refusal with the renewal etc.

By combining these two dimensions (the number of refusals acceptable and the possibility of re-granting the right to benefit) the three qualitative anchors are established at the following levels. The lower cut-off point (no obligation, fully-out) represents the situation, when receivers of the benefit are not punished at all for refusing a job offer. Consequently, the upper cut-off point (fully-in) is reached by countries where any job refusal leads to automatic suspension of the benefit without the right to re-apply for it. As decided after analysing different combinations of policies also in the Western Europe (Esping-Andersen, Regini et al. 2000), the cross-over point characterizes relatively moderate version of sanctions – with suspension of the benefit without the perspective for re-gaining it, however, after two refusals of job offers. The scores between these three critical points will be evaluated according to the further sanctioning power of the arrangements. Thus, for instance, less strict (than cross-over level) versions of policies – with more rejections of a job offers needed for withdrawing the right to benefit, or shorter brakes in receiving the benefit, are the basis for intermediary points. The same applies for the more stricter arrangements. Where appropriate, the sanctioning power of the given solution is softened in the (very rare) cases of the benefit reduction, instead of their total suspension. Table 1 summarises this section and gives a starting point for the empirical analysis.
Table 3: Specification of indicators and translation of data to fuzzy-score ranges and verbal qualifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical indicator</th>
<th>Fully out</th>
<th>Mostly but not full out</th>
<th>More or less fully out</th>
<th>Neither in nor out</th>
<th>More or less in</th>
<th>Mostly but not fully in</th>
<th>Fully in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility of the unemployment compensation based on work requirements (ratio of work requirement to period of reference) and scope of eligibility</td>
<td>1 (Res)</td>
<td>.99-.75</td>
<td>.74-.51</td>
<td>5 (Sel)</td>
<td>.49-.38</td>
<td>.37-.26</td>
<td>&lt;25 (Univ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity measured as the replacement rate</td>
<td>&lt;30</td>
<td>30.1-37.4</td>
<td>37.5-44.9</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45.1-52.4</td>
<td>52.4-59.9</td>
<td>&gt;60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of the unemployment compensation in weeks</td>
<td>&lt; 12</td>
<td>13-25</td>
<td>26-37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39-59</td>
<td>60-77</td>
<td>&gt;78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligations of the unemployed measured by the number of negative sanctions plus possibility of re-establishment of the benefit</td>
<td>No obligation</td>
<td>2 refusals, no possibility</td>
<td>After 1st refusal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unemployment compensation in CEE – emerging patterns?

Analysing changes with regard to particular dimensions of comparison is helpful for grasping the practical side of reforms. However, the main goal of this paper is the configurational analysis. For this purpose the four dimensions of the unemployment compensation policy are taken into account. This gives 16 possible combinations. The table below presents only the highest scores of the unemployment compensation policy dimensions for each country in selected years.

Table 4: Fuzzy membership scores of unemployment compensation policy in ideal types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>A·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>A·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>A·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>A·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>A·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>A·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>A·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>A·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>a·G·d</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>A·G·d/ a·G·D</td>
<td>a·G·d/ a·G·D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>a·G·d</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>A·G·D·O/ A·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>A·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>a·G·d·O</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>a·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>a·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>a·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>a·G·D·O</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When it comes to the country developments, they are the following. The policy of the Czech Republic in the initial phase of the transformation was characterised by easily accessible benefits of high generosity. The unemployment compensation was paid for the quite long period, however it was coupled with strong obligations of the beneficiary (A·G·D·O). Later on, the period of payment was shortened and the generosity reduced, which resulted in the policy of high accessibility, moderate generosity, short duration of a benefit payment and extensive obligations of an unemployed person (A·g·d·O).

Estonia, just after the introduction of unemployment compensation made the program easily accessible, generous, but it was paid for a short time (A·G·d). Then, the level of benefits was decreased and was rather moderate till the end of the analysed period. At the same time, the obligations was kept minimal (A·g·d·o).

Hungary introduced the unemployment compensation even before the collapse of the socialist regime. The policy in this country was rather stable, characterised by high accessibility to the compensation, which was generous and paid for a long time. At the same time, the obligations of unemployed were high (A·G·D·O).

Second Baltic country, Latvia, in the very beginning pursued rather universal and generous policy. Later, however, entry conditions became stricter and the level of benefit dropped. In the second half of the 1990s, the level of benefit was increased, but the duration of payment was moderate. The obligations were minimal (a·G·d·o).

Last country from the group of former Soviet republics, Lithuania, pursued policy which was different from both, Estonia and Latvia. In the very beginning, the compensation was easy to enter and generous, but in the following years the rules became stricter. In the second half of the 1990s, more loose rules of access were restored and the role of obligation grew. From then the policy was characterised by high accessibility, low generosity and short duration of payment, but at the same time, unemployed were subject to serious obligations (A·g·d·O).

Poland in the first years introduced the policy which was easily accessible, generous and imposing obligations on the unemployed. In the following years these were changed: the rules of access were made stricter and the benefits were not generous anymore. With the reduced obligations imposed, the type of policy was a·g·D·o.

Slovakia, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, pursued the policy which did not resemble the developments in the Czech Republic. Thus, in the initial period, the policy was similar (A·G·D·O), but afterwards, the role of obligations was reduced (a·G·d·o). In the final
part of the analysed period, another change took place: the policy was not accessible, of a moderate generosity, short duration and with marginal obligations.

Finally, Slovenian unemployment policy was marked by only one slight change. Accordingly, until the mid-1990s the compensation policy was hardly accessible, generous and with a strong role of obligations (a·G·D·O). Afterwards, the duration of benefits payment was cut and became moderate and therefore, the policy moved to the combination A·G·d·O.

As noticed above, the analysis of unemployment compensation policy in the post-communist countries is especially interesting due to the fact that in most of these countries this kind of policy did not exist during the state-socialist period.

One of the first observation is that at the beginning of transformation the reformers created quite open and generous system of income support, though the rights to unemployment benefits were also connected with relatively high level of obligations. In most of these countries, therefore, persons, who registered as unemployed, were automatically entitled to the benefit. In Poland, for example, the first version of regulations concerning unemployed allowed for receiving the benefit with no formal constraint concerning its duration. Still, after the first signs of unemployment, reformers in most of these countries started to introduce restrictions. In the Czech Republic and in Slovakia the duration of the period of payment was shortened by half, in Poland, on the other hand, the qualifying criteria were restricted by introducing income-testing, and the level of benefit was established as a flat-rate, not generous payment. For the Czech Republic this resulted in shifting from conforming to the ideal-typical combination with all the dimensions scoring high (A·G·D·O) to the one with low score on duration (A·G·d·O). Poland underwent the most dramatic changes – from conforming to the same, as the Czech Republic, ideal-type in 1993, Poland’s unemployment compensation policy stabilised in the cluster scoring low in all the dimensions (including obligations), but with the long period of payment (a·g·D·o).

Second, while some countries experienced more changes, others were relatively stable. Interestingly, the cases of stability and resistance to change are the two countries, where the unemployment compensation programs were already in place. Slovenia represents the example of a stable unemployment compensation policy – a characteristic combination for this country ensures generous level of benefit, but paid not for a very long time and after meeting quite demanding qualifying criteria (a·G·d·O). Similarly, in Hungary the generous and accessible version of unemployment insurance scheme prevailed for most of the time (A·G·D·O). On the contrary, policy developments in other cases, and especially in the newly existing countries, were undergoing more reforms. Interesting cases for comparison are here
Czech Republic and Slovakia, that took two different paths after starting from the same one. The former, thus, sustained the form of quite strict obligations, and at the end of the 1990s generosity of the benefits started to be undermined. In Slovakia, the reformers did not decide for enhancing the sanctions, however, recent changes include more demanding qualifying criteria. The latter fact resulted in this country’s shift from the combinations of policies with accessible and generous benefit paid for shorter period and with no serious obligations attached to it (A·G·d·o) to the one with restricted accessibility (a·G·d·o).

Third, contrary to expectations, not all the policies were equally introducing restrictions. In Estonia, where the level of benefits has traditionally been the lowest in the region, the element of more generous benefits is slightly introducing change in the last two points of time under analysis. As this change is not radical, it results in distinguishing two combinations with ambiguous meaning of the score on generosity dimension. Lithuania, representing again more stable case, increased accessibility to benefits, but accompanied it by more clearly defined obligations of the unemployed. Additionally, it also shifted to combination with small score on generosity (and respectively, this country changed membership in the ideal-types from the combination a·G·d·o to A·g·d·O).

Fourth, while these reforms could be easily observed, as the time was passing by, they rarely proceeded in different directions. In other words, no ‘trial and error’ phase of frequent policy shifts ‘back and forward’ took place, as it could be observed, for example with regard to childcare policy (Szelewa and Polakowski 2006). Instead, the policies took rather divergent paths and the changes were introduced in a more incremental manner. Therefore, shifting from one combination to another was hardly ever revolutionary – usually it involved reforming only one element out of four constitutive dimensions and involved delicate changes within this dimension. One of the consequences of such developments in policies are ambiguous results for the last two to three years, where two – instead of one - combinations are dominating. This problem is discussed also in the next section.

Finally, the reforming tools were very divergent. In the Czech Republic and in Estonia the unemployment compensation policies were reformed through changes in generosity, in Lithuania and in Slovakia transformation of the system is channelled through reforming the rules of accessibility, and in Latvia and in Hungary changing duration was the element of reforms. Interestingly, in all these three pairs of cases developments went in the opposite direction.

In short, one cannot talk about consolidation of the policies in this region. After initial similarities, these countries took divergent paths of development, reforming their policies with
different tools and in different directions. Still, the changes have more evolutionary than revolutionary character.

**Analysis of childcare policy**

This section deals with development of policy aimed at families with small children. The structure of this part is similar to the previous one. First, it introduces dimensions of comparison. Next, it operationalizes them and presents the translation of empirical indicators into fuzzy scores. The section concludes with a discussion concerning observed patterns.

This paper deals with two components of the policy: public childcare arrangements and leave policies. More precisely it looks at four dimensions: extensiveness and quality of the publicly provided childcare, and generosity and availability of the parental leaves. The operationalization of each dimension is presented below.

The extensiveness of the childcare is operationalised through the net enrolment rate in a pre-primary education. The choice of the net rate allows for a proper assessment of children’s attendance, as it relates the number of children of official school age who are enrolled in educational institutions to the population of the corresponding official school age. This way, one may infer about the capacity of state-run institutions to accommodate specific social needs concerning institutional childcare (Rostgaard 2000a).

The upper cut-off point (fully in the set) is established at the level of 80 percent (Hantrais 2004). This level is found as satisfying for Scandinavian, universalist type of childcare policy, characterized by almost full coverage of children in the pre-primary education age (3-6)(Kvist 1999). Further, as Linda Hantrais argues such a high level is justified when the significant percentage of women is active in the labour market. As it was the case also in Central and Eastern Europe during the (early post-) socialist period (Deacon and Szalai 1990; Ferge 1995; Haney 2002), this qualitative anchor seems reasonable. As far as the cross-over point is concerned, it has been established at around 50 percent of the net enrolment rate. Comparative studies indicate that levels similar to that one reflect modest coverage (Daly and Rake 2004). Finally, the lower qualitative breakpoint for the extensiveness set will equal to 20% of children enrolled in the public pre-primary education. This level refers to very marginal engagement of public authorities in the childcare policies (Gornick and Meyers 2003).

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2 This part is based on Szelewa and Polakowski 2006
Therefore, the lower cut-off point is established at the level of 16 weeks and 0.3 of the average net wage. As compared to the Western countries this seems to be a bit high threshold for the set membership, still, this seems to be more relevant for the character of pro-natalist and overall more generous and maternalist policies. Establishing the level of financial support was inspired by the variety of solutions in the Western world – like wage-related (in the Nordic countries), or flat-rate (in the continental Europe) benefits plus the observations concerning the levels of average net replacement rates in the post-communist countries. The cross-over point corresponds to the moderate state’s support discussed by Gornick and Meyers, i.e. one year with the lower support (0.3 of the average net wage) accompanied by the system of generous maternity leave provision (26 weeks and full wage replacement). This also seems reasonable for the eight of the new EU member-states, as high standards are the characteristics of the period short before and short after the child’s birth.

Then the extended period of the leave usually reaches 3 years, but there exists a variety of financial support, usually in the form of the flat-rate payments. In the Western world parental leaves were not introduced at the same time and families in many countries still do not have the right to such a long period of the child care leave. Simultaneously, the communist countries were the pioneers in introducing paid parental leaves already in the late 1960s and 1970s (Szikra 2005). For all those reasons the upper cut-off point for the analysis, as expressing possibly generous combination of the parental leave provision comprises of the high standard of maternity leave (51 weeks paid in full) plus the three-year-old parental leave with the flat-rate payment at the level of 0.3 of the average net wage. All these provisions are also available to a different degree. This is tackled by the dimension of universality.

The following approach is proposed here: one takes into account the coverage and the conditions that are to be met by the person eligible for the benefit, as the basis of the universality assessment. In other words, it is analysed which social groups are eligible for the parenthood-related benefits and which situations are taken into account as the basis for the entitlement. The upper qualitative point is set for the situation where every citizen is entitled to some basic benefit and the access to it is not conditional.  

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3 One might say that if the access to the benefits does not require special conditions, than the programme is fully universal. However, this situation is purely theoretical, because even in Scandinavian countries, perceived as the most universal, one has to meet the criterion of residence or citizenship (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, the condition of citizenship or residence still should be perceived as the emanation of universal provision. In the literature there is a discussion about a dual nature of universality: it is said that both the liberal and social democratic regimes provide universal benefits. (Clegg and Clasen 2003; Clasen and van Oorshot 2002). However, this applies only to the general rule: in both regimes the benefits are financed through taxes, but the eligibility criteria are significantly different. While in the case of liberal regime there is the condition of passing
The lower cut-off point is characterised by the benefit which is provided by the state, but it is means- (income) tested. Finally, the cross-over point should reflect the situation where there is a clear link the level of a benefit and a contribution. Thus, in effect one has a triad of welfare provision: it can be universal (fully in), contributory (cross-over) and finally selective (fully out). These three broad clusters were divided into smaller parts in order to allow for more fine-grained analysis, encompassing the combinations of principles and taking into account different scope of application within each cluster.

Specification of empirical indicators and translation of data to fuzzy score ranges and verbal qualifiers for all four dimensions are presented in Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical indicator</th>
<th>Fully out</th>
<th>Mostly but not fully out</th>
<th>More or less fully out</th>
<th>Neither in nor out</th>
<th>More or less in</th>
<th>Mostly but not fully in</th>
<th>Fully in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extensiveness of the family policy measured as the enrolment rate of children in the kindergartens</td>
<td>&lt;20%</td>
<td>20.1-35</td>
<td>35.1-49.9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50.1-65</td>
<td>65.1-79.9</td>
<td>&gt;80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of the family policy measured as child:staff ratio in the kindergartens</td>
<td>&lt;12</td>
<td>10.51-11.99</td>
<td>9.1-10.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.51-8.99</td>
<td>6.1-7.5</td>
<td>&gt;6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity of maternity-related benefits measured by the index based on weighted replacement rate and duration of benefits*</td>
<td>&lt; 4.2</td>
<td>4.3-21.5</td>
<td>21.6-41.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>41.7-69.5</td>
<td>69.6-98.7</td>
<td>&gt;98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality of parenthood-related benefits (maternity and parental benefits) measured as the combination of principles guiding the access (residual, selective and universal)</td>
<td>Means-test, Means-test**</td>
<td>Insurance, Means-test</td>
<td>Insurance, Insurance</td>
<td>Insurance, Insurance (no conditions)</td>
<td>Universal, Means-test</td>
<td>Universal, Insurance</td>
<td>Universal, Universal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* calculated according to the formula given in the text: the number of weeks paid maternity leave times the replacement rate plus the same but in relation to the extended leave (child-care leave, etc.);
** first: maternity leave, second: parental leave (extended, childcare, etc.)

the means- (income) test, in the social democratic one, only requirement of the citizenship or residence is in power.
Patterns of family policy in CEE

This section aims at assessing the membership of childcare policies in combinations of the aspects analysed above. It should be recalled that it is not enough to take into account one dimension of policy to state about its location in a given cluster because, as showed, they might be very similar in all but one respect. This, in turn, can be decisive for constituting another kind of childcare policy. Therefore, the policies should be analysed as the configurations of aspects.

In this paper the four dimensions of childcare policy are taken into account. This gives 16 possible combinations. A membership of each combination of sets is assessed and the highest value is chosen. The table below (Table 6) presents only the highest scores of the childcare policy dimensions for each country in selected years. As far as the highest scores are concerned, the policies conformed to thirteen ideal types.

Table 6: Fuzzy membership scores of childcare policy in ideal types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td>EqGu(.57)</td>
<td>EqGu(.79)</td>
<td>EqGu(.7)</td>
<td>EqGu(.78)</td>
<td>EqGu(.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EqGu(.56)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.53)</td>
<td>EqGu(.62)</td>
<td>EqGu(.65)</td>
<td>EqGu(.58)</td>
<td>EqGu(.57)</td>
<td>EqGu(.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>EqGu(.85)</td>
<td>EqGu(.88)</td>
<td>EqGu(.87)</td>
<td>EqGu(.87)</td>
<td>EqGu(.7)</td>
<td>EqGu(.1)</td>
<td>EqGu(.51)</td>
<td>EqGu(.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>EqGu(.66)</td>
<td>EqGu(.56)</td>
<td>EqGu(.82)</td>
<td>EqGu(.59)</td>
<td>EqGu(.63)</td>
<td>EqGu(.56)</td>
<td>EqGu(.61)</td>
<td>EqGu(.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>EqGu(.71)</td>
<td>EqGu(.54)</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td>EqGu(.67)</td>
<td>EqGu(.72)</td>
<td>EqGu(.7)</td>
<td>EqGu(.68)</td>
<td>EqGu(.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>EqGu(.74)</td>
<td>EqGu(.51)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.57)</td>
<td>EqGu(.54)</td>
<td>EqGu(.51)</td>
<td>EqGu(.51)</td>
<td>EqGu(.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td>EqGu(.55)</td>
<td>EqGu(.63)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>EqGu(.55)</td>
<td>EqGu(.54)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.63)</td>
<td>EqGu(.52)</td>
<td>EqGu(.74)</td>
<td>EqGu(.61)</td>
<td>EqGu(.54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table reveals development of childcare policy in CEE. Main trends for each country will be described.

As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, the policy was rather stable and only one change occurred. In the first half of the 1990s Czech childcare policy was characterized high extensiveness and low quality with benefits being generous but not universal E-Q-G-u. In the remaining period the policy resembled the type of high extensiveness, low quality of kindergartens and universal and generous benefits.
Estonian childcare policy fluctuated a lot in the first half of the 1990s and then stabilized. The policy type in the later period involved high extensiveness and quality of the institutional childcare accompanied by universal, but not generous benefits (E·Q·g·U).

Hungary pursued one type of policy for the whole period. The public care was extensive and of low quality, while the benefits were generous and universal (E·q·G·U).

The policy of a second Baltic country, Latvia, was changing quite often. First, it represented the e·Q·g·u. After the reform, the benefits became generous and universal, however soon their level dropped. Finally, the childcare became extensive, which resulted in the policy shift to the E·Q·g·U.

Lithuanian childcare policy did not follow the pattern of other Baltic countries. While fluctuating in the first part of the analysed period, it stabilized afterwards. It resembled the policy type of low extensiveness and high quality of public childcare and easily accessible benefits of high generosity: e·Q·G·U.

Poland for almost whole period had one model of policy. It scored low on all the dimensions (e·q·g·u).

Slovakia, after some changes in the beginning of transformation, pursued exactly the same type of policy: E·q·G·U as the Czech Republic.

Finally, Slovenia, after the collapse of Yugoslavia faced some changes in its childcare policy. The 1990s. saw fluctuations in the mixes of policy to end up with the model of high extensiveness and low quality of public kindergartens coupled with generous and universal benefits.

Generally, few conclusions arise. First, one may distinguish four clusters of policies in CEE. Accordingly, the first combination, which almost solely happened to be the case of Poland, is the low score in all the four dimensions (e·q·g·u), that is low extensiveness and quality of publicly provided childcare combined with neither generous nor universal leaves. Another, quite considerable group of countries (here: the Czech Republic and Hungary in some period, but also Slovenia and Slovakia) seemed to pursue the policies characterized by high extensiveness and low quality of childcare with the leaves of considerable generosity and universality. The third group of cases comprise the countries with low generosity of parental leaves provisions with the rest of the dimensions scoring high (E·Q·g·U). Finally, when all the dimensions approach the full set membership (E·Q·G·U), the family is reaching support both in terms of leaves and childcare infrastructure.

More general conclusions are following. The policies are marked by many qualitative and quantitative shifts. This is especially visible in the case of the newly emerging countries.
(especially in the case of the Baltic republics). Accordingly, the initial period of transition can be characterised by many policy shifts, resulting from various adjustments (mainly concerning labour markets changes) and ‘trial and error’ strategies (Offe and Preuss 1998). For the later stage of transition, one may talk about the consolidation of policies, which did not change their characteristics so significantly. Therefore, it makes sense to talk about two policy stages: the one of a trial and error and later, the consolidation of models in the second part of transition.

**Pensions, childcare policy and unemployment compensation in a comparative perspective.**

So far the analysis focused on single policy developments. This section aims at a brief comparison of transformation of pensions, family and unemployment compensation policy. First it focuses on the situation around 2004 and then analyses developments over time.

The social policies of the Czech Republic were of a mixed character. The pensions were moderately generous and universal, with no involvement of a private sector. The unemployment compensation was easily accessible, moderately generous, with short duration of benefit payment and high level of obligations. The childcare policy consisted of extensive childcare of poor quality combined with generous and universal benefits. It seems that in the case of the Czech Republic the role of market is rather residual and the state supports its citizens (in a modest way, however).

To sum up Estonian social policy, in the end of analysed period the pensions underwent the reform, which is expected to be hardly accessible, not generous and partially provided and by the private sector. The unemployment compensation was easy to enter, guaranteeing modest level of benefits paid for short time, but without obligations. The childcare policy was extensive, of high quality, with universal but not generous benefits. Here one can see clearly some signs of individualisation of responsibility and privatisation (pensions), but other fields remain in the domain of public provision, characterised by guaranteeing sufficient standards.

Hungary also introduced significant reform of pensions, but childcare and unemployment compensation policy show signs of continuity. The pension system involves some elements of funding, is supposed to be less accessible but at the same time, generous. The unemployment compensation is accessible and generous, both in terms of level of benefits and the length of payment, but imposes some obligations on benefit recipients. The childcare policy is characterized by extensive care of poor quality combined with generous
and universal benefits. Again, in the case of pensions there are signs of individualisation and privatisation, but otherwise the standards of the system are rather high.

Latvian pension system joined the club of radical reforms, heading in the direction of restricted access, low level of benefits and involvement of private sector. The unemployment compensation is restricted to most needy, is generous, of modest length of payment and consists of no obligations. The childcare is quite extensive, but of low quality and is combined not generous benefits, though easy to obtain. As with a majority of reformed systems in the region, there is tendency towards individualisation and restricting access, which is also the case of unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the state provides extensive services to individuals with small children.

Lithuania is the country which, within the timeframes of this analysis, did not introduce a radical pension reform. The pensions remained sole responsibility of public authorities, however their level was low and accessibility restricted. The unemployment compensation was universal, but not generous. Finally, the childcare policy was characterised by high extensiveness and quality of institutional childcare, while the benefits were accessible and universal. The case of Lithuania is therefore ambiguous: the childcare policy had high standards, but the levels of pensions and unemployment benefits was low. To sum up, the main provider of social policy was the state, its involvement varied, however.

The policies of the biggest country of the region, Poland, followed quite the same pattern. Accordingly, the pension system is significantly reformed, with expected low level of benefits and restricted access to them. The system consists some private, funded element. When it comes to the unemployment compensation, it was also rather rudimental, aimed at those very needy, without too much obligations, however. The childcare is not extensive, characterised by poor quality. The benefits are rather generous, but focused on very narrow group. Social policy of Poland should be seen as the example of quite marginal involvement of the state, and marketisation and individualisation of responsibility. The examples might be the new pension system, but also the unemployment compensation. The childcare remains the almost exclusive responsibility of a family, as the market alternative is not available.

Slovakia in the analysed period did not reform the pension system. It remained highly universal, not generous, with no involvement of a private sector. The unemployment compensation remained restricted to most needy, with a high level of benefits and no obligations. The public childcare was extensive, low quality, while the benefits we generous and universal. The policy of this country is based on the involvement of the state, with some restrictions concerning unemployment benefits.
Finally, Slovenia also has the mixed social policy. The old-age pensions are highly universal and generous, without a private component. The unemployment compensation is aimed at those in hard financial condition, is generous, but paid for a short time and combined with many obligations. The childcare policy is extensive, but low quality and combined with generous and universal payments.

This short comparison shows wide spectrum of policy mixes. It seems hard to find one underlying logic for each policy and combinations of them. Rather, there are different logics which underlie each specific policy mix. Paragraphs below draw on this point more thoroughly.

When it comes to the beginning of transition, all three policies were characterized by some variation across countries (to different extent, of course). This observation leads to two conclusions. First, that the policies inherited from the socialist past were already varying. If one assumes some degree continuity and stability, it means that family policies had different shapes already in the pre-transition era. This argument goes against the assumption of communist social policy as a monolith. Second, the variation in the unemployment compensation points to the fact of existence of multiple designs already in the early phase of this policy development. Finally, the countries which conducted radical reform of pension systems, not necessarily implemented the same type reform in other fields of social policy. This diversity may lead to the point that the transformation of social policy has been a multiple process from the very beginning and there did not exist one template of the policy design and implementation.

The emphasis on multiple transformations of social policy ought to be even stronger when one considers the development over the whole period. The changes (and consolidation) took place at different pace and order in each social policy area. The lack of one general pattern resembles the point of Bruszt and Stark about multiple pathways of transition. According to them, the plurality of transition has a double meaning. First, it relates to a variety of transition strategies in countries of the region. Moreover, the transition should be seen as an inconsistent phenomenon from a country perspective, involving processes in economy, polity and society, each with different timing and temporality (Stark and Bruszt 1998).

The issues of diversity of policies and their multiple transformations lead to more general remarks. The analysis presented above pointed out that in many instances the transformation of social policy was gradual and involved a change in one dimension of a programme rather than abandoning the old one and introducing completely new solution. The
change of one dimension does not necessarily involve reform—it may be the result of non-action as well (Hacker 2005). Such style of the transformation calls for more thorough analysis of social policy in the region, which should be sensitive to the modes of institutional change like drift, layering and conversion (Streeck and Thelen 2005). This analysis may signal this sort of change—especially when one considers the situation of ‘hybridisation’ of social policy programmes (which takes place when policy starts belonging to a second ideal types and memberships in the two types are becoming almost identical).

Summary

The aim of this paper was to analyse and compare unemployment compensation policy and family policy in the eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the period 1989-2004. This paper has demonstrated the usefulness of the fuzzy set ideal-types analysis. The emphasis on the close relation between theoretical concepts and empirical material provides a solid grip for studying (the change of) policies. The configurational view of phenomena combined with an inductive analysis of conformity to ideal types allows for revealing policy types excluded by existing typologies. Finally, the approach has proved to be useful for the analysis of continuity and change and/or divergence of the social policies.

The conclusions from the empirical findings are following:

- One cannot talk about one general pattern of change—the family policy underwent the phase of trial and error and consolidation afterwards, while unemployment compensation policy is still in flux. Pensions in some countries were significantly reformed, while in others they demonstrate some continuity;
- Changes in the ideal types of the unemployment compensation and family policy were rather incremental than revolutionary and rare rather than frequent. This applies to the first phase of pension systems reforms. The second phase of pension reforms marks a significant, revolutionary change;
- The direction of these changes might be observed by identifying new (apart from old) dominating combinations of policies that can potentially (but gradually) dominate and converse the existing institutional solutions. Also, in order to capture the direction of change, it is necessary to look at delayed effects of reform.
As noted above, due to the limited diversity of social phenomena, not every combination may find an empirical instance. However, in this study each combination found a case conforming to it.