Migration and social policy in Europe.  
South Europe in the mirror of European traditional immigration countries  

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Introduction

In a general sense immigration has intensified in Europe since the mid-1990s, although over the last three years it seems the upward trend might be coming to a halt. Accumulated net migration among the 27 member states is situated at around 600,000 people a year in the second half of the 1990s. The period since 2002 to 2004 it multiplied by three (between 1.8 and 2 million people a year) compared with mid 90s figures.

Behind this general trend we find however, as we can see in the next section, a variety of sufficiently significant differences, both in quantitative (migration flow and stock of migrants) and in qualitative terms (origin, characteristics of migrants and type of migration) which should make us reflect on their political implications and ask if a consensual discourse and a “homogeneous” European policy match his diversity.

During this time a series of events related to illegal immigration networks (human smuggling and trafficking networks) or to ethnic minority conflicts of coexistence have attracted the widespread attention of the mass media and public opinion throughout Europe. Despite the peculiarities of each member state, the immigration debate has extended beyond frontiers, just as the immigrants themselves do, generating a perception of homogeneity which is not in keeping with reality. In any case, over the last decade, immigration has moved on for being a question of European policy for being included in the common European agenda.

In connection with this general trend, throughout this time, European institutions have been building a common political debate on the question of immigration. In this sense, the Council of Tampere 1999 (Finland), which set the basis for a European policy on immigration, had a certain premonitory character, anticipating the intensification process of immigration which was still to come.

In this paper we will attempt to highlight the ambivalence of European policy on immigration, contrasting (and in so doing, explaining) it with the marked differences in immigration phenomenon in the various member states. We will review the differences in terms of the intensity of the migratory flow and the presence of foreigners, as well as the difference in immigrant status in the work markets of the member states, or the diverse orientation which each welfare state model adopts in dealing with immigrants. In all these cases, we will attempt to make up for the lack of knowledge and reflection on some specific realities, such as those in the Southern European countries, an area of strategic importance at the present time. From this counter-position we aim to identify the tensions that will have to be dealt with in order to build a comprehensive political discourse and a common policy in Europe concerning migration.

1. Building a Common European Migration Policy in Europe

The Council of Tampere tried to reflect comprehensive understanding in its analysis of the diverse aspects in such a complex phenomena as migration: the

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1 Both these figures and others provided by Eurostat on immigration in Europe must be considered as an approximation. Apart from not including systematically all countries (it does include those experiencing greater migratory flows), national sources are still not sufficiently homogenised.

economic and demographic development needs of Europe, the reception capacity of member states, the situation of the countries of origin or the need for policies of integration of immigrants were some of the aspects dealt with. However, its real effects were clearer on reinforcing mechanisms of controlling migratory flows and on adopting a more restrictive policy in this direction (either on the effective reduction of the flow in some countries, or only on the formal adoption of certain measures in other countries). On the contrary, it was less effective in developing integration policies: the 2003 guidelines on family reunification and on the status of long-term foreign residents, which tended towards equal treatment with nationals, were perhaps its main achievements in this direction. Only recently, the question of the social integration of immigrants seems to be taking shape, moving more clearly towards the policies of the different member states.

Worth highlighting in this sense is the approval by the European Council in 2004 of some Basic Common Principles (Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union)\textsuperscript{3}. This common approach actually combines two very different interpretations on migrants’ integration:

- A culturalist approach which understands integration as “a dynamic, two-way process” for immigrants and residents, of an eminently cultural character (values, attitudes, behaviour, etc.) and which focuses actions, more asymmetrically\textsuperscript{4}, on respect for the basic values of the European Union, on the knowledge of the host society, on the promotion of spaces of interaction or on the respect for religious freedom provided it does not affect other individual rights\textsuperscript{5}.

- A materialist approach which sets out employment as a “key part of the integration process”, marks the importance of efforts in education (although also emphasises its importance in transmitting norms and values) and reminds us of the legal obligation in Europe of applying the principle of no discrimination (equal treatment) in employment, education, social security, health care, access to goods and services and housing\textsuperscript{6}, while advocating the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and the “mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios”\textsuperscript{7}.

This combination of perspectives has its explanation, as we will see, in the different situations and sensitivities expressed in the public debate in each member state and at the same time has given rise to specific approaches and measures clearly differentiated in each case.

Some measures have been taken at a European level related to this general approach: a network of National Contact Points of Integration, a handbook and a website on integration, a European Integration Forum, and Annual Reports on Migration and Integration prepared by the Commission. All this development of a

\textsuperscript{3} These Common Principles were later developed, as a Commission Communication, in a “Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union” COM(2005) 389.

\textsuperscript{4} A contradiction has been signalled between the first principle (two-way integration) and the second (respect of European values): Carrera, S. (2006). “Programas de integración para inmigrantes: una perspectiva comparada en la unión Europea.” Migraciones 20. The statement actually proposes a balance between them.


political discourse and specific actions at a European level follows the methodological guidelines of other Community policies, based on the Open Method for Coordination such as the employment policy or the social inclusion process.

The influence of the European Court of Justice has also been underlined, when advocated the access of member state national’s relatives to the European Community regimen (freedom of movement and equal access to social rights). European pro-immigrants groups have also intensively lobbied on Commission officials and some social achievements such as anti-discrimination laws could be explained by this development.8

It is undoubtedly an important trend that is affecting the decision making process at a national level in each member state, but which, given the different circumstances of each country and the different problems which must be confronted, gives rise to enormously diverse specific decisions and actions. Thus, it is interesting at this point to present the reality which these policies attempt to handle or influence, a reality that is deeply marked by diversity.

2. Diversity in European immigration and integration process

Curiously, in its second report, the Commission found that the main “common” trend in immigration policies in Europe is that “the diversity across the EU is growing”.9 The first difference to be highlighted is, as mentioned previously, the varied intensity with which the migration phenomena is affecting different countries. In the following graph we can see the enormous differences in terms of migratory flow. The most recent migrations (in terms of net migration) do not affect, very significantly, half of the European countries. Among this group are primarily all the member states of East Europe, who are however experiencing certain immigration in part requesting asylum in transit to the north and centre of Europe and in part a replacement immigration coming to cover the gaps by the national population in their march to the West.

However, in this group we also find other countries with a greater immigration tradition, with high levels of wealth and generous Welfare States, such as the Netherlands or Denmark. Particularly worth mention is that some of the debates which have had greater repercussions in Europe have been caused by events or by political decisions within such nations10.

10 Denmark has been a focus of attention arising from the conflict generated after the publication of a cartoon strip depicting Mohammed (even though the controversy arose after a certain time lapse from the date of publication and could have been due to other aims at an international level). The Netherlands was also the object of public debate in Europe on several occasions with the assassination of the director Van Gogh or the political leader Fortuyn with the rise of the extreme right in the country or with the approval of new policies aimed at compulsory integration measures in stark break with their liberal and multicultural tradition.
Net migration in practically all countries with a stronger tradition of migration in the past decades is found, in relative terms, to be below the European average, situated at 3.8‰ for the first five years of this century (similar to Belgium). Leaving aside the case of Luxemburg, given its special characteristics, the only notable exception is Austria.

It is necessary to remember that certain countries, in spite of having a relatively reduced migratory flow, especially those that are larger in size (such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom), concentrate the arrival of new immigrants in especially determined regions, so the social and economic impact of the immigration is perceived more intensely than would be expected with an overall perspective.

What we are interested in, however, is to highlight the vitality of immigration in the south of Europe: 6 out of 10 immigrants settling in Europe every year do so in southern countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus or Malta\(^\dagger\). All of them, except for Greece, experience a net migration higher than the European average, as much as four times higher in some cases. Bearing in mind the absolute and relative values, Spain is without doubt a spectacular case in the international context, experiencing one of the most intense migratory processes in the developed countries (in

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\(^\dagger\) Ireland, another new immigration country, is functioning in this aspect as a southern country: high net migration explained by its economic dynamism. Since catholic tradition seems to be the main similarity, the key explanation of this relationship should be found through a deeper comparative research.
2004, the second country in the world receiving immigrants in absolute terms\textsuperscript{12}). The result of this flow is spectacular for a country that a few decades ago was an emigrant country: in 1998 there were 351,000 non EU citizens registered in their municipalities. In 2005 the number was 2,956,000. In eight years the number of Non-EU citizens in Spain has been multiplied by ten\textsuperscript{13}. Now Spain is the 10th country in the World with more foreign population\textsuperscript{14}.

Paradoxically there are several authors who underline the restrictive nature of Spanish migration policy. Even some Spanish researchers have defined it as a “half-open doors” policy\textsuperscript{15}, perhaps focusing their analysis more in the political debate than in empirical data. Beyond this discourse, these countries should be characterised as the most liberal in Europe for migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.</th>
<th>Foreign population in some EU countries by 100 inhabitants. 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>900,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>258,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>270,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,287,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>314,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,002,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,670,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>38,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>32,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>181,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>156,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>691,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>814,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>25,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>48,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>25,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>113,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>479,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,066,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: De and Uk, 2005.

Source: Author's calculation, based on Eurostat microdata

If the calculation could be done on the basis of foreign borne population, the distribution would present some differences: in Sweden for example, foreign borne population is 12.4%, and non-EU borne population is 7.8%. For Denmark these figures are 8.6% and 5.9% respectively.

\textsuperscript{13} INE: Municipal Register (continuous census).
\textsuperscript{14} UN: Population and Development Committee.
### Table 2. Growth of foreign population in some EU countries (1987-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-11.421</td>
<td>41.012</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>59.208</td>
<td>123.646</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>347.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>32.356</td>
<td>94.500</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-26.066</td>
<td>2.661,187</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.463,525</td>
<td>206.565</td>
<td>642.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>199.700</td>
<td>37.600</td>
<td>174.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.785,959</td>
<td>247.405</td>
<td>201.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>38.950</td>
<td>37.700</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>13.654</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.488</td>
<td>157.408</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>70.202</td>
<td>440.553</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>138.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>65.834</td>
<td>81.334</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.595</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>40.278</td>
<td>51.981</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>313.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-46.695</td>
<td>140.957</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>945.055</td>
<td>-465.000</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>-18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** De y U K to 2005; Po to 2003. Be since 1989; Cz e It since 1990

Source: Author’s calculation, based on Eurostat microdata

We could therefore be witnessing the development of a new migratory model in Europe in which the main protagonists are the countries arching the Mediterranean, converging on a series of factors: geographic proximity to Africa, cultural and linguistic affinity with Latin America, economic dynamism which demands non qualified workers or the existence of an important sector of underground economy being the key factors.

In accordance with the more classical analysis of Ravenstein¹⁶, the countries in the south of Europe would play the role of a southern port in Europe and as stop-over countries on the way to the more wealthy north, with higher wages and more developed welfare states. However, in the last few years, countries in the south of Europe have become the preferred destination for many immigrants, not only African and Latin American, but also for those coming from East Europe.

European policy initially reinforced the policing role of the south of these countries, politically and economically supporting the development and improvements in border control. The double argument was that “clandestine immigration was a ‘threat’ to the stability and welfare of European status and societies” and it was necessary to “prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean, protect the migrants against the human smugglers and ensure the rights of genuine refugees”. The final result has been labelled as a “militarisation” of border controls in the Mediterranean¹⁷.

This is the second aspect of the Mediterranean migratory model (and therefore, the European model) which on many occasions has not been well understood. The model of irregular and intensive immigration which is characteristic of Mediterranean countries is only very partially explained by a lack of control at the border.

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The model of irregular and intensive immigration in Southern Europe

The string of *cayucos*\(^{18}\) arriving at the coasts of the Canary Islands over the past summer has reinforced the image of an invasion of Africans which seemed to question the safety of the southern Spanish frontier and by extension the European (an image that had previously formed with references to the *pateras*\(^{19}\) crossing from Morocco, to other ships arriving to Italy from Albany, or the *en masse* attacks on the border fences in Ceuta and Melilla). An alarmist reaction and a sensation of helplessness has been sparked off that seems to call for the introduction of exceptional measures and which is unleashing a demagogic political debate both in the opposition and, lately, in the government, and which has also had repercussions in European circles.

It is, therefore, convenient to relativise the importance of the problem, in terms of migration policy. The flow from Sub-Saharan Africa towards the Canary Islands is no more than a small part of the overall inflow in Spain: since 2001 an average of 0.6 million immigrants enter Spain each year. Whatever the number of immigrants that reach the Canary Islands past year, just under 30,000, this represents on around 5% of the total immigrants arriving each year; for each arrival by *cayuco* there are, at least, another fifteen immigrants making their way into Spain, the majority also without work permits or residence papers, although by less dangerous routes (by plane, bus, etc.) and therefore free of the tremendous cost in human lives when coming from Africa to Spain. With Rumania alone, the annual net balance of immigrants is 100,000 people crossing Europe to Spain; with Latin America more than 200,000 who arrive showing their passport to the police force at domestic airports, and in many cases also through other European airports.

Figure 2. Main regions sending immigrants to Spain: Evolution of foreign population by origin

The identification of the migration function in Mediterranean countries as the “Southern frontier and stepping stone to Europe” needs to be questioned in the light of the origin of migratory population flows (coming primarily from America and Europe),

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\(^{18}\) Flat-hulled African fishing canoes

\(^{19}\) Small open fishing boats
and also because most of the immigrants arriving to Spain decide to definitively settle here.

As a whole, sub-Saharan immigration represents 3.8% of the total foreign population living in Spain. Objectively, for various economic, political and geographic reasons, migration has been more difficult for those persons living south of the Sahara, and the route opened by the cayucos will not especially correct this “objective discrimination” compared to other groups. If this migratory flow is to be controlled and channelled, it needs to be done above all for humanitarian reasons, to avoid the cost in terms of human lives and suffering in this irrational crossing, and not because it poses a serious immigration problem.

While recognising the legitimacy of condemning the human drama of these routes, the images have overwhelmingly contributed to stigmatising immigrants as a whole and to intensifying the process of “estrangement”, increasing the symbolic distance by the host population: building the “otherness”.

In any case, this irregular flow is no more than a minimal part of the total inflow which should not distract us in our overall diagnosis. In places such as Navarra, we calculate that only 7% of immigrants have entered illegally, (in pateras, cayucos, container trucks or similar). This proportion is only slightly bigger for the whole of Spain. In comparative terms it has been acknowledged that illegal entry into Spain is less in relation to other countries in the South of Europe.

However, although minimal, this illegal flow illustrates the limits of prohibitionary policies of border closures: if previously immigrants travelled 14 km. to cross the Straits of Gibraltar, and then opted for getting to the Canary Islands from Morocco (about 160 km) they are now prepared to undertake crossings of nearly 1,500 km from Senegal in cayucos and from Guinea-Conakry, “a diversion effect towards longer and more dangerous routs”.

Furthermore, what the “cayuco crisis” has also shown is the limits of the Spanish migration model over the last decade, a model based firmly on irregularity and, therefore, scant control by the government: “the lack of institutional mechanisms and administrative inexperience related to planning, regulating and managing immigration (due to) unexpected changes and quick transformations have produced a precipitate policy forced by the new facts”. Yet the key of this irregular and intensive migration model is not in the illegal entry (dodging border controls) which continues to be the secondary, but in the large demand of unskilled workers in an irregular labour market.

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that offers real possibilities of finding jobs without even the necessary permits (especially in agriculture and domestic service, but also in other activities). In the long term, if an important sector of hidden economy and irregular employment continue to exist, the control of migration flows will continue to be limited.

As a more optimistic possibility in the medium term, it is possible to think that both dominant profiles of immigration in the south of Europe, and especially in Spain (the irregularity and intensity of the flow), could become less important in the future. On one hand, formal employment has spectacularly increased since the middle of the 1990s and it is possible that this trend, if it continues, will bring about a certain reduction in irregular employment, at least in relative terms. Secondly, the introduction and development of new instruments of regulating the migratory flow could channel a proportionally greater part through legal mechanisms. In this sense, access to work and residence permits through contracting in the country of origin organised by companies themselves, or the access of immigrants without permits to residence authorisation on the grounds of social or labour stability, seem to be having special effect.

3. Important differences in the labour dynamics of immigrants in Europe.

The inter-relation between national labour markets and the migration process also varies greatly from some cases to others. Generally, it has become evident over the last decade that, in the absence of an explicit policy of labour immigration adapted to the needs of the labour market, the effect of immigration in this area has not had the positive effects that might have been expected nor has it moulded to real needs:27

The south of Europe has been doomed to receive an intense flow of immigrants without papers who, demanded in various ways by national employers through their fellow countrymen and women already residing in the country, tried to find jobs in the irregular market. This flow has enabled the rates of irregularity, typical of markets in the south, to continue or even to rise.

Meanwhile, several countries in the north witnessed the arrival of a migratory flow that was neither chosen nor explicitly demanded ("not selected at all"28), of asylum seekers and family reunification. Only some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France or Netherland, have shown any explicit interest in attracting highly qualified immigrants, although these policies have had relatively reduced effects and dimensions. “Family reunification has become the most important inflow in the total humanitarian inflow” in many countries in north west Europe such as France, Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom: an effect of the combination of two factors, on the one hand the operation of family networks of sizeable communities of immigrants well-settled decades ago and on the other hand the legal commitments which European regulation imposes on this question.29

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In several cases the right to reunification means only residence permit for most spouses and children, keeping them out of the labour market and “prolonging dependency from the bread-winner”.30

As a result, the labour integration of immigrants is becoming notably easier in countries in the south of Europe. In the following table you can see a comparison of employment rates for a group of selected countries that are normally used as an example of the three welfare regimes identified by Esping-Andersen31 and widely used in international comparisons of different aspects of social policy. We include here two sufficiently significant countries from the south of Europe (comparative data on Italy are not available).

Both in Spain and Greece (as well as Portugal) employment rates are higher for non-EU foreigners than the national population, both men and women.

Table 3. Employment rates by sex and nationality in selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>Non-EU nationals</td>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>Non-EU nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUROSTAT, LFS 2002 (Q02)32

On the contrary, in the other countries that are incorporating a significant number of immigrants, whatever the welfare-employment regime, labour integration of extra-EU foreigners seems to be more problematic, especially in the case of women. This is the case both in countries with more regulated work markets (France and Germany) and in those that have developed intense policies of deregulation (such as the United Kingdom and Denmark). A more wide-ranging development of active employment policy does not seem to have a decisive influence on the gap in access to jobs among the national population and immigrants (Sweden is a paradigmatic case in this aspect). The cause could therefore reside in a radically different migratory model in various aspects.

In several countries, “the reluctance to select immigrants for labour market purposes leads indirectly to a selection of humanitarian immigrants through other existing gates for immigration (family and asylum-refugee based) which are completely dissociated from labour market needs and labour market requirements”33

33 Ibid.
One would have to assess the possible disincentive that the more generous Welfare regimes could introduce in the labour integration of determined sectors of the population, and specifically the treatment received by immigrants (especially those arriving as asylum seekers).

In addition to this, other factors that explain the difference in the countries in the south would be the composition of the immigrant population (coming from Latin America, with a more settled history of urban living and wage-earning process in the case of immigrants arriving in Spain, for example) as well as the fact of these countries in the south of Europe finding themselves in an initial phase of migratory process (a process marked preferentially by labour dynamics and motivation) and the high demand for workers for low-skilled jobs in the labour market (more so in the case of Spain with an increase in employment above the European average since the middle of the 1990s).

However, the speed of the migratory process in the south of Europe and the lack of comparative analysis among these countries means the situation of immigrants in the labour market is not always well understood, and that the importance of the enormous process of incorporation of recently-arrived immigrants in employment has been extremely underestimated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Asylum seekers /Net migration (%)</th>
<th>Asylum seekers /10000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12575</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>24,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3590</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>9,9</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2280</td>
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<td>33,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28915</td>
<td>12,7</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>1,9</td>
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</tr>
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Source: Author’s calculation, based on Eurostat microdata
This process has had serious implications for economic growth and for the boost in fiscal revenue and social security contributions, bolstering (at least provisionally) the sustainability of the Welfare State in countries such as Spain. Only the recent regularisation in 2005 meant, for example, the emergence of more than half a million irregular workers and the corresponding Social Security contributions: a 1,500 millions € increase was calculated for 2006. Calculation made by the President’s Economic Office\textsuperscript{34} estimated that 50% of GDP growth could be explained by immigration in Spain during the last 5 years. The immigration would have caused an increase in activity rate, specially for women (1/3 of 12 percent point increase), and 2 percent points reduction in unemployment rate. As a result, in 2005 a surplus of 5,000 million € was generated in public administrations’ budgets by immigration (0.5% of GDP). Other estimations at regional level had reached similar conclusions\textsuperscript{35}.

\textit{Improvements in employment quality for migrants in southern countries: the case of Navarre (Spain)}\textsuperscript{36}

Normally the characterisation of the process of labour integration of immigrants in countries in southern Europe is marked by two basic ideas: that the immigrants are integrated into irregular employment in the informal economy\textsuperscript{37}, and are confined exclusively to a few low-skill and extremely precarious sectors (agriculture, construction and domestic servitude). Also, Spanish researchers have underlined the precarious characteristics of immigrants’ jobs: intensive work, low wages and hidden (informal) employment\textsuperscript{38}.

In an immigration process as intense as that in Spain, it is necessary to bear in mind that the vast majority of immigrants have not been in the country very long and that their situation therefore, can only be assumed to be not very good. A more dynamic perspective that allows us to see the evolution of foreign workers over time (and therefore of those who have been settled for longer) would probably portray another relatively different picture.

The process of improvement in working conditions can clearly be seen in the following graph that shows the differences in the labour situation depending on the period of residence in Navarre\textsuperscript{39}. It is not exactly a dynamic analysis but gives an idea on the changes experienced by immigrants in these early phases of the settling process.


Positive indicators (employment rate and proportion of skilled jobs) reflect a clearly positive trend while negative indicators (underemployment of skilled workers with low qualified jobs, irregularity of employment, the unemployment rate, over-exploitation or excessive working days) tend to fall significantly.

In the majority of the indicators analysed, most outstanding is the comparative improvement in the situation of those residing six or more years in Navarre. A follow-up of the situation of these persons in the future would have to reveal whether this is due simply to the fact they have been here longer or whether it is also influenced by the fact that a more intense migratory flow represents a comparative disadvantage (greater competition for resources and work) for those migrants who have arrived in the last few years.

Figure 3. Some indicators on access to employment and employment quality by length of residence, for immigrants from non-EU countries. Navarre, 2003.

In addition to this comparison, we have been able to undertake a dynamic analysis from a series of retrospective questions introduced in the 2003 survey, with a parallel structure for 2000 and 2003. This gives us an approximation to the labour transition of immigrants already here in 2000 for these three years. This is what we present in the following graph.

From this we can deduce an overall positive image of the labour transition of immigrants. Three out of every four immigrants who were unemployed in 2000 and

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40 Proportion occupied in irregular employment (with or without Work Permit).
41 Proportion occupied with hourly remuneration below the hourly minimum wage.
42 Proportion occupied with a working week above 50 hours.
43 The intense territorial mobility of extra-EU immigrants within and beyond Navarre, and the subsequent difficulties of location this involves, dissuaded us from undertaking a longitudinal analysis, xxx of the immigrants interviewed n 2000. Hence, the improvements in working conditions reflected in these data are at the same time the result of a selection process in which at least a part of those failed in their attempt to get labour and social promotion above certain minimums, could have gone in search of better luck elsewhere.
one out of every three inactive had found work in 2003. Seven out of every ten irregular immigrants in 2000 had obtained regular employment in 2003 and the irregularity in the employment of those who obtained work permit had reduced by half. Fifty percent of the agriculture labourers had left this activity, and one out of three domestic workers had taken up other activities. This means that four out of every ten immigrants in these two “unprotected” sectors had changed jobs.

Access to skilled jobs, still in the lax interpretation which we make here of the term, is less clear and the positive itineraries of some, practically compensate with the negative itineraries of others. There is here a strict “glass ceiling” for immigrants which, in spite of their skills and knowledge, limits their access not only to upper executive posts (we are not yet in this phase, just like when question of gender relations emerged), but simply overcoming their circumstance as day labourers, farm workers, waiters, specialist workers or domestic servants.

44 We identify as unprotected employment (together with informal work) primarily work in agriculture and domestic servitude as these activities are both subject to special social security regimes without unemployment protection, where the written contracts are the exception and where there is extensive deregulation/decontrol in the working conditions.

45 We identify as skilled work anything that is above the level of labourer.
From the point of view of gender applied to this retrospective analysis, it is necessary to point out that women have considerably greater difficulties in giving up the more gruelling jobs and obtaining certain labour promotion (three out of every four domestic servants continued in this work after these three years). Furthermore, as demonstrated from other research focused on immigrant women in large cities, when it occurs, labour mobility of domestic servants to other sectors (hotel trade, care services, ethnic economy, etc.) “there is a recurrence of many of the characteristics of domestic...
service employment (...) unstable, non skilled, poor remuneration and/or socially low or medium esteem**46

It is this aspect of limits to labour promotion of immigrants, and of the more or less hidden discrimination processes behind it, that will have to be dealt with seriously in future decades. It is possible to formulate the hypothesis that, if means of improvement are not found here, these obstacles will considerably limit the benefits which the whole host society might receive from the migratory process itself and may, at the same time, be laying the foundations for reactions of discontent and social conflict by the immigrants themselves.

Finally, another significant indicator in this process of labour integration is the verification of access to stable employment, a characteristic that has been decisive in the dualisation of the labour market in Spain**47. The proportion of non-EU immigrants with temporary employment continues to be an overwhelming majority (we estimate three out of every four wage-earning immigrants are temporary workers); practically in reverse proportion to that of the host population. These differences, however, could decrease progressively if the incipient trend of labour stabilisation, recorded in the register of job placements, consolidates itself. Indeed, in graph 3 it can be seen that the number of persons taking up indefinite employment has multiplied by seven in five years, and the yearly proportion of workers signing a permanent contract who are immigrants is clearly above their weight of the active population (8.3% in 2003, including irregular contracts).

Figure 5. Evolution of permanent contracts to foreign workers. Navarre, 1999-2003

![Graph showing evolution of permanent contracts to foreign workers in Navarre, 1999-2003.](image)

Source: Contracting Register of Navarre Employment Service.

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The working conditions of immigrants in the south of Europe are hard and their salaries minimal. It is possible to think that these conditions will be accepted (to a certain extent they are being accepted) if they fulfil two conditions: in the first place they experience certain improvements in the short-medium term so that the jobs taken up reach a minimum level of dignity (something which longer-settled immigrants seem to be achieving at least in certain regions). Secondly, in the long term the hope (or illusion) should exist that the children of immigrants will have access to more definitive social and labour promotion, in conditions of greater equality of opportunity. This is one aspect which seems to have been of utmost importance in understanding the conflicts of coexistence and frustration of the children and grandchildren of immigrants, in some countries, namely France. However, there is no reason to presume that this dynamic will be similar for the children of immigrants who are now settling in the south of Europe.

At the moment, what can be said is that, from the perspective of quality, which the European Strategy for employment advocates, negligible advantage is being made of the potential human capital provided by the immigrants; something which, although to a lesser extent is also true for the national population. Both are overskilled for the demands of the labour market.

Furthermore, the vulnerability of most of these jobs, given the lack of family solidarity networks for most recent immigrants, could produce a process of social exclusion and could also increase the unemployment expenditure in a future recessive economic context.

In summary then, it is necessary to analyse in more detail the comparative perspective between the different European countries on the process of labour integration of immigrants (not forgetting the countries in the south of Europe given their importance within the whole of the EU). The time variable for this is fundamental in two senses: in the first place because it should make us distinguish between foreigners (or ethnic minorities) definitively settled in the country, and newly arrived immigrants; and secondly because more than the contrast of photos, what we need is a dynamic analysis which shows us the labour transitions over time for individuals, and the trends of changes in structures.

In any case, the differences of EU immigration’s performance in different models of labour market already indicates the different consequences which immigration is having on social policies: in countries in the south, at least provisionally, immigration represents an interesting contribution to financial resources for public administrations, and has made possible the expansion of determined social programmes both for immigrants and for the population as a hole. In countries in the north, in the light of available literature, it seems to be representing an additional financial burden which intensifies the question of the sustainability in the medium and long term of their ample welfare programmes.

4. The cost of solidarity

When the acceptance of a determined migratory flow is preferably understood as an exercise in solidarity for humanitarian reasons, immigration is unavoidably perceived

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in terms of cost (more or less legitimate depending on the social group, the time and the country concerned). This, it seems, is the debate which is presented especially in the north of Europe. In objective terms, the cost of immigration should not be too high when the flows are kept relatively reduced in all these countries (practically zero in some cases). What is feared is not so much the economic impact on the overall public accounts, but the ideological and political repercussions of the verification that foreigners, far from contributing, could be consuming part of the “national” wealth. What is in question then is the process of legitimisation of social protection systems, the Welfare State as a whole.

As expressed by Guiraudon, up to the 1970s “during the ‘guest worker era’, foreigners contributed more in taxes and social contributions than they received because of their age, family situation and because of the conditions laid down in laws and agreements regarding benefits”. Afterwards, employment discrimination, family reunification, access to benefits such as family allowance and the pressure from social mobilisations, reversed the balance and immigration came to represent a greater cost for Welfare States. 49

Diverse research has shown that “immigrant needy people are at the bottom of the deservingness rank order, and negative views on immigrants and their numbers are associated with higher conditionality of support.” 50 This trend, which relatively homogeneously would affect the whole of the EU, would however have more intense effects on those cases in which immigration is clearly associated with an economic cost and not perceived as a positive contribution for the society as a whole. In reality, the incorporation of immigrants to the social rights would have happened in Europe in the 1970s and 80s, in spite of the generally contrary public opinion, and thanks to the silent role played by the courts that attempted to apply legislation coherently, of the administrative bureaucracies, that applied standardised procedures on decision making and experts and academics in general of a more liberal orientation 51.

However, the difference between the distinct welfare regimes has become evident here 52:

Some countries such as Germany, with a Welfare State model considered “conservative”, based on a contributory system, would tend practically to exclude immigrants from social rights. Its contributory character would basically introduce a homogenising logic, but the reduced access of immigrants to employment and a migratory regime which conditions the renewal of permits to the maintenance of employment and not depending on social assistance (the self-sufficiency principle) means that the effective social rights of immigrants, conceived as “guest workers”, would be less than those of German workers. They would not be acknowledged the right to family allowance. Furthermore, access to nationality has been extremely complicated until the last few years (although the 1999 reform grants nationality to the

children of immigrants and other foreigners with more than 8 years residence), so consolidating over time their situation of “social exclusion”.

Another consideration worth looking at is the handling of ethnic German immigrant (Aussiedler), who has enjoyed preferential treatment in access to many social programmes (housing, language learning, pensions, vocational training, etc.). The reform of the mid-1990s has reduced many of these rights and even provided for the disappearance of the status of “Aussiedler” as from 2010.

The traditionally generous policy of granting the refugee status (determined in the constitution) has also been associated to the granting of a permanent residence permit which introduced a greater degree of equality with the native population and facilitated to a certain degree access to social benefits.

In short, Germany is an example of how a stratification process has been institutionalised in social policies for immigrants, discriminating depending on its regime of entry and residence in the country, and forming in this way an important handicap for their full integration in the society.

Sweden, the Nordic country in the EU that experiences a more intense migratory process, both in relative and volume terms (although below the average for the EU), and especially receptive (in comparative terms) to political refugees, represents the opposite side of the coin. The egalitarian logic of its welfare system is strongly anchored on the principle of residence which tends to treat immigrants and nationals equally. The elimination of the test of self-sufficiency for access to nationality (after a minimum residence period of five years) and family reunification (even elderly parents), the recognition of the right to vote in local and regional elections (since 1975) were especially significant elements of how the relationship of the migratory system and the welfare regime is formulated in this country.

This egalitarian logic which implies great generosity (in comparative terms) with the newly arrived, is politically and economically sustainable if the migratory flow is kept relatively reduced. When in the 1990s, coinciding with an economic recession which affected especially the employment of immigrants, increasing therefore the costs of social assistance, together with an intensification of the arrival of asylum seekers (100,000 between 1992 and 1994), the reaction was a combination of tightening-up policies and general cuts in social programmes (which logically affected immigrants more than anyone) with a hardening in the policy of asylum which went back to awarding temporary permits (at the same time with less social rights). The association between both reforms, of social policies and migratory policy, had the obvious effect of linking both questions and of signalling immigration as the origin of the financial difficulties of the Swedish Welfare State.

The combination between employment-welfare regimes on the one hand and migratory systems on the other has not been sufficiently studied and in each country we can find possibly different logics of operation. Within one welfare regime we can find different forms of dealing with immigrants due to different cultural traditions (republicanism, multiculturalism, ethnicity, post-colonialism, etc.) but also due to different functional needs (demands of the labour market) or to international commitments.

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53 Ibid.
54 Some empirical analyses have found that “intra-regime variations stand out in the case of the liberal and social democratic countries” with regard to the treatment of immigrants and to their results in terms of poverty reduction through social transfers. (Morissens, A. and D. Sainsbury (2005). "Migrant's social rights, ethnicity and welfare regimes." Journal of Social Policy 34(4).)
In addition, it has been proven that the use which immigrants make of social programmes is not the same as that of the population as a whole. Generally, it can be said that, while access to employment benefits and pensions is more reduced for immigrants, their presence (in asymmetric compensation) is greater in social assistance schemes, with a means test. In other programmes, such as family allowances, the access of immigrants may be similar to that of the native population. However, the differences between countries are also important due to the impact of specific norms in each case. The result of this greater or lesser capacity to accede to determined allowances shows, as was to be expected, significant differences in terms of poverty rates and the reduction of these due to the transfer of income: “Not only are citizens more likely to be above the poverty line, if citizens are poor before transfers they are more likely to be lifted above the poverty line compared with migrants”. One special exception could be Sweden (among the cases analysed) where the effect of social transfers was similar for immigrants and for nationals.\(^55\)

In this sense the empirical evidence is still not sufficiently contrasted, as can be seen in the results of two researches which, starting out from different sources and with different definitions and for distinct periods of reference, come to extremely contradictory conclusions:

Table 5. Poverty rate for migrants (below 60% of national median equivalent disposable income after social transfer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Morisens &amp; Sainsbury(^56)</th>
<th>Orsolya Lelkes(^57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>LIS mid-90s</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2004</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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It is evident that prior to developing an explanatory construction of greater analysis in terms of the articulation of welfare-employment regimes and migration systems, we should work towards a more detailed analysis of the empirical evidence with regard to the treatment of immigrants with a view to their access both to the labour market and to social benefits.

From the point of view of the south of Europe, the combination of growing fiscal income and special needs due to immigration has been a source of social innovation and improving welfare programmes both for immigrant and for the host society. In Spain, some improvements have been made in retirement pension system and a new wide programme to cope with care needs for the elderly has been put in practice because of the healthy budget of Social Security.

In specific policies for immigrants we can observe the increased intervention by the central state administration in social policy with the aim of encouraging the social integration of immigrants. The government has now started a Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and Educational Support (Fondo para la Acogida y la Integración de los Inmigrantes y Refuerzo Educativo -FAIIRE) which consists of

\(^55\) Ibid.

\(^56\) Ibid.

specific financing for activities in this field\textsuperscript{58}, dedicated to enabling town councils and the autonomous communities to finance their programmes. This fund is managed through agreements between the central state administration and each of the autonomous communities. The fund was approved for the first time in 2005 with a quantity of 120 million euros available, which was increased by 52\% in 2006 and 55\% in 2007 up to 282 million euros.

Furthermore, the Spanish autonomous communities have tried to design their own migration policy, which appears relevant given the diversity of forms that the phenomenon of migration takes in Spain. The first autonomous communities that approved their plans for immigrant (mainly social policy and cultural measures) were Cataluña, Andalucia, Madrid and Navarra, during the second half of the nineties. Most regions have now similar document approved by their governments and/or parliaments. Although these plans have provably had a very limited impact in real terms, this has been the first step for shaping the official discourse by the regions and nations on this topic, offering a diagnosis of the specific problems in each territory. They have also introduced the first institutions for channelling social demands by immigrant’s organizations and NGOs.\textsuperscript{59}

Some social rights have been granted for immigrants in Spain: access to school is generalised for immigrant children and health care is the same as to Spanish citizens. Nevertheless, housing problems have been enormous during the last years, and the access to unemployment and welfare benefits don’t prevent high poverty rates for immigrants in Spain (around 37\% for non-EU nationals, 8 percent point more than nationals\textsuperscript{60}). A very few immigrants are pensioners (due to their demographic structure) but the access to training schemes is also reduced even though the huge necessity on this aspect. Thus, there is a large possibility to expand welfare programmes during the years to come.

In summary, given the initial stage of migration process in the south, a better knowledge of evolution is transcendental and to what extent the exhaustion of the positive economic and social impact of immigration is an inexorable law (if it is true and verifiable in all countries with ample migratory tradition, which does not seem to be the case); whether it has depended on an adverse economic context (the employment crisis dating from the 1970s and the change in the productive model and the restructuring of the markets), or whether it is specifically attributable to the norms and institutions which have regulated entry into the country, access to employment and social rights of immigrants.

Taking into consideration the reality of the migratory flows at the present time (preferably concentrated in new countries of immigration) responding to this question

\textsuperscript{58} The cooperation framework defines 12 lines of action: Welcoming, Education, Social Services, Employment, Housing, Health, Infancy and Youth, Equal Treatment, Women, Participation, Awareness and Co-development, in which the actions included in the action plans to be developed by the autonomous communities will be framed directly or by the town halls. Half the fund will be given over to integration and admittance and the other half to education.


transcends the interest of this handful of countries in the south and constitutes an element of interest on a European scale.

5. Cultural disintegration and civic integration policies in Europe

Even more than the failure of labour integration of immigrants or the cost which their maintenance represents for social programmes, the greatest fear which has embedded in Europe with regard to immigration is the failure of their cultural integration. The threat to the “basic values of the European Union”\textsuperscript{61} from the existence of certain minorities which do not respect the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms takes the shape, in the collective imaginary, of a broad range of events from the “war of the veil” in France to the massive terrorist attacks in London or Madrid.

Many events of this type have been presented as proof of the failure of the integration (preferably cultural) of immigrants in Western Europe. Starting from this idea, widely extended in public opinion by the mass media, various countries have introduced significant changes in their migration policies with the aim of achieving what has become known as “civic integration”. The changes have been such that they have even been referred to as “the weakening of national distinctiveness” and the end of “national models”\textsuperscript{62}.

Civic integration would be the result of a Foucauldian liberalism defined by a series of repressive policies towards immigrants\textsuperscript{63}: the introduction of certain activities and commitments, of an obligatory nature, aimed at guaranteeing adequate knowledge of the language, customs, laws and basic institutions of the host country.

The most paradigmatic case would be Holland, a country which displayed its tolerant liberalism to diversity and multicultural recognition and which with these new measures would seem to have taken completely the opposite direction. In a context in which certain ethnic minorities are especially affected by unemployment, high dependence on social welfare and a marked spatial concentration, and in which the only possible immigration route was family reunification or asylum, policies of civic integration are introduced as a control mechanism (aimed at reducing the entry of low-skilled) which partly explains the fall in the total inflow of immigrants (although in reality this has been evident since 2002 in this country\textsuperscript{64}). In 2003 the Newcomers’ Integration law (WIN) introduced the obligation of 12-month courses including learning the language. In 2006 it became obligatory for immigrants to finance this training themselves and the need to pass a test in order to get a permanent residence permit. New immigrants should attend these courses at their countries of origin before entry.

France is another case (although basically more coherent with their assimilation and Jacobean tradition) going from “initial voluntarism towards the obligatory and coercive pole” and, as Sarkozy said, “from unwanted to chosen immigration”. When family migration represents 73%, the way to limit this migratory flow was the combination of increasing residency requirements and cohabitation on the one hand

\textsuperscript{61} This is the second common basic principle stated by the European Council in 2004.


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} Net migration in Netherlands has reduced from 56,000 people in 2001 to 28,000 in 2002; and down to –25,000 in 2006 (Eurostat: Population and Social Conditions)
and, on the other, the introduction of integration requirements as the fulfilment of a contract (CAI\textsuperscript{65}).

It was intended that this tendency, initially introduced by Holland, would really become a general trend throughout Europe\textsuperscript{66}. “The compulsory participation in integration programmes and courses, together with the need to pass them satisfactorily, constitutes an essential ingredient in the juridical framework of immigration, and a key requirement for which immigrants could have access to a “secure juridical statute”\textsuperscript{67}.”

In reality this type of initiative seems to have really taken hold in a relatively limited number of countries, and normally without reaching the level of enforcement as in the case of Holland. The emphasis on this type of civic integration seems to be clearer in Holland, Flanders, Denmark, Germany (applied with more discretion), France (where the contract implies certain negotiation) or in Austria (for the language). But it is not clear that it is easily identifiable in other countries without certain fine distinctions. The United Kingdom, for example, proposes introducing a points system to evaluate the knowledge of English. Italy has introduced a few pilot projects on civic integration but it does not represent any meaningful trend by the moment. In other cases, such as Luxemburg or Finland, it simply involves the same logic of negotiation as applied to recipients of social assistance benefits (minimum income for integration). In some countries that have been identified with these practices (such as Spain or Portugal) there is no obligation to learn the language. On the contrary, no comprehensive and consistent framework has been built to manage cultural diversity in these countries. Other cases such as Sweden, in spite of having perhaps introduced some reforms, basically maintains its model of multiculturalism. And there continues to be an important number of European countries (note the data in the first section) where immigration is extremely reduced and the question of civic integration does not present itself\textsuperscript{68}.

The origin of immigrants may undoubtedly be a relevant variable in posing the question of civic integration. Generally, in the following table, it is possible to see a significant presence of Europeans among the settled foreign population in all the countries for which there are data. It is not surprising that the objective being stated is the safeguarding of European values, when the majority of foreigners settled in the EU are precisely European. In the light of this data is seems reasonable to think there is a need for greater clarification of the aims of these civic integration strategies.

In some cases, such as Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy, the significant presence of Latin American immigration is an element that forces the question of civic integration in a different way. In these countries, the question is seriously posed with the North African population, but curiously there is no policy of cultural integration specifically planned for these groups.

\textsuperscript{65} Initials corresponding to the French “contrat d'accueil et l'intégration” Integration and Reception Contract


Table 6. Foreign population by nationality in some EU-27 countries. 2006\textsuperscript{69}

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<tr>
<th>EU27</th>
<th>Other Europe</th>
<th>Northern Africa</th>
<th>Rest of Africa</th>
<th>Northern America</th>
<th>Central, South America and Caribbean</th>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>37.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>59.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>20.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>42.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>91.8</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat microdata

Civic integration has been presented as a way of dealing with the integration of newly arrived immigrants when in reality the problem of countries developing this strategy is not (recent) immigration but the ethnic minorities already settled in the country decades ago. These minorities are not affected by such strategies, since they have fully settled with permanent residence permit and even acquired nationality. On the contrary, countries that are currently receiving most immigrants do not seem to be paying too much attention to this question, which could mean that in the medium term, for some collectives, the problems of integration detected in other countries with a longer tradition of immigration could happen here.

The debate in Europe on whether obligation and coercion are adequate methods for transmitting democratic values and national identification has not yet emerged: at the very least an ethic doubt has cropped up (coherence between the ends and the means) and a methodological doubt (in terms of efficiency). It would be interesting to analyse the real integration effects of these actions in the future on countries such as Holland or France, both for newly arrived immigrants and for well-settled ethnic communities, prior to acritically transferring this type of approach to other countries.

The political debate which has built up in the European Union with regard to the cultural dimension of integration (civic integration), uppermost in the Basic Common Principles, as we saw previously, introduces a legitimate discussion and seems necessary from various points of view. In Southern European countries, it could be considered a positive influence which leads them to reinforcing actions aimed at facilitating knowledge of the language of the host society and its institutions. There is, however, a certain risk that this debate could lead to legitimating a concept of integration policies as another mechanism for controlling the migratory flow, which given its coercive character, could enter into direct opposition with the very principles it aims to preserve, in particular individual freedom and non discrimination.

\textsuperscript{69} Eurostat does not provide information on the nationality of foreign residents for the other countries for this year.
Conclusion

We have demonstrated in this paper how the migratory phenomenon in Europe and the policies that attempt to tackle it are experiencing an intense process of change over the last few years. This change, far from taking the same direction for the whole of the European Union, reveals a mixture of diverse tendencies, even conflicting in some aspects.

We have seen how many countries with a long tradition in receiving immigrants have tightened up on the migratory flow, how they have become more selective in the search for high skilled immigrants with greater possibilities of self-sufficiency. In these cases, the integration policies emphasise the more cultural aspects of civic integration, and are progressively understood more as an imposition, converting these policies of integration into authentic tools of control and selection of the immigration flow.

Conversely, in the last decade, new countries of immigration have emerged in the European Union, not only because of their border situation or proximity to the sending countries, but preferably for the combination of a whole series of internal factors (economic dynamism, demographic deficit, informal economy, cultural proximity). These countries are less selective in their migratory flow, partly because they have still not fully developed their own capacity of control, are experiencing some of the most intense immigration processes, both in relative and in absolute terms, and not only in the EU but also in comparison with other developed countries. In these countries the emphasis is not so much on civic integration but on the more urgent needs of reception, social support and labour integration (as well as the border control and reception of illegal immigrants at these points).

This dissimilar situation in terms of migratory flow and handling of immigrants is both the cause and effect of the different dynamics which newly arrived immigrants and well-settled ethnic minorities are having. While immigration has represented a process of revitalization of the whole employment market in countries in the south and is being more efficiently integrated in employment, other countries of central and north Europe are witnessing a relative failure in this aspect, becoming in itself an important handicap for social integration and having a very negative influence on the perceptions of the host population.

The position of immigration in the work market is crucial to an understanding of the distinct relation of immigration with social policies. Going beyond the discernible differences in the fiscal balance of migrations in some cases and in others, we are still lacking precise knowledge of the treatment which different social devices apply to immigrants, their level of access to benefits and the results obtained in terms of social integration.

Both in the dynamics of migration flows and in the process of integration in employment or its relation with social policies, the question still needs to be answered of whether some of the peculiarities evident in countries in the south of Europe are due to the fact that they find themselves in the preliminary phase of a migratory process which will have to follow the steps previously taken by other European countries with a long tradition of immigration, or whether, being another historic moment and having a different social model, the process these countries will have to follow could be radically different.

We have not included in this paper a demographic analysis comparing the differences in the need of immigration for the sustainability of European Welfare State, but the relevance of this structural variable has been underline at international level.
(both by UN and OECD) and its positive impact has been proved at a national\textsuperscript{70} and regional level\textsuperscript{71}.

Finally, we must point out how the diversity of the map of migrations in Europe contrasts with the apparent uniformity of the political debate and with the guidelines issued by European institutions concerning policies of migration control and policies aimed at the social integration of immigrants. The European institutions’ discourse persists in calculated ambiguity as a way to satisfy the different national sensitivities on this subject, but in the future, a clearer explanation of the different situations which help in steering its management at a European level needs to be planned. The EU policies in general have had a positive effect on reinforcing a common commitment on the more humanitarian dimensions of migration policies (family reunification and asylum, for example, although in these aspects there continue to be important differences) and on some basic approaches to integration policies (the principle of no discrimination and civic integration). The incipient nature of the EU policy in this field, however, means that its effects are notably limited. Non-desirable effects may even arise concerning the legitimisation of some of the more coercive strategies being planned in Europe, and which use integration policies as another element to control and limit the migratory flow, without resolving the problems of coexistence generated by the unfavourable social situation of certain ethnic minorities.

\textsuperscript{70} Izquierdo, A., D. López de Lera, et al. (2006). Demografía de los extranjeros. Incidencia en el crecimiento de la población. Bilbao, Fundación BBVA.

References


