

Preliminary Draft

**The Nordic Gender Paradise Lost?
Gender Inequalities in Employment, Work Segregation,
Wages, and Political Representation in Different Types of
Welfare States**

by

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What consequences do welfare states have for gender inequality? In the long debates on these issues among social scientists, we find some drastic twists and turns.¹ Early feminist interpretations saw the welfare state as an extension of a patriarchal state to maintain the subordination of women to men. Such a view was soon widened to consider the state not as a monolithic system but as involving complex structures and actors. Energized by responses to the pathbreaking analyses by Esping-Andersen (1990) in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, research in this area took a comparative turn. Within such a broader perspective, analysts focused on the role of women in the development of social policies and welfare states (Lewis 1992, 1994; Skocpol 1992; Koven and Michel 1993; Hobson and Lindholm 1997; O'Connor et al 1999; Misra and Atkins 1998). It also generated scholarship on "variation in the effects of social policies on gender" (Orloff 1996:56). Comparative analyses of such variation came to put the search light on Nordic countries, the politics and welfare state institutions of which came to be widely seen as promoting women's interest via "woman friendly welfare states" (Hernes 1987). Thus, for example, Bryson (1992:110) praised the Nordic welfare states, where "the vicious circle' of women's political, economic, and social disadvantage is being replaced by a 'virtuous circle' through which gains in one area interact with gains in another, to produce a general picture of cumulative progress." What sometimes appeared as a celebration of a Nordic Gender Paradise was however soon tempered when several scholars argued that in this Paradise of germinating gender equality treacherous snakes are hiding: their woman friendly policies have boomerang effects, perversely contributing to increase major aspects of gender inequality.

The purpose of this paper is to use theory and empirical data to adjudicate between competing interpretations on consequences of welfare states for gender inequality. This undertaking requires that we decompose the concepts of the welfare state as well as of gender inequality. While welfare states have often been conceived of in one-dimensional terms, we specify major differences among countries in respect to policy institutions likely to have specifically distinct effects on gender inequality. The term "woman friendliness" has tended to conceal that among women as well as in society at large we frequently find competing and contradictory concepts with regard to desirable goals for interrelationships between women, men and families. The concept of gender inequality therefore has to be specified to capture its different aspects, two major ones being agency inequality and economic inequality. Earlier research has often focused on separate empirical expressions of potential effects, each at a time, such as earnings, occupational segregation, or labor force participation. We argue that the social processes assumed to generate gender inequality are of such a broad scope that they require a simultaneous analysis of multiple effects of welfare states in terms of agency inequality as well as of economic inequality. In these processes inequalities with respect to gender and class are likely to be intertwined. Our analysis therefore considers effects of welfare states on gender inequalities in terms of labor force participation, work segregation, wages, job quality, and political representation. To the analyses of such effects, sociologists, political scientists, and labor economists have contributed.

The paper begins by a brief review of the main arguments in debates within sociology, political science and labor economics on factors driving country differences in gender inequality. We argue that to understand the causal processes behind such variation it is fruitful to focus on policy institutions which mediate effects from driving forces to outcomes with respect to gender inequality. Our two-dimensional typology of gender policy institutions identifies three rather distinct gender policy models represented in different clusters of countries: one market oriented model with only limited claim rights to citizens, a second having claim rights supporting a traditional family model with women as secondary earners or homemakers, and a third providing claim rights enabling a dual earner family model where both parents are involved in paid work, with each cluster tending to have different roots in

¹ For reviews, cf Hobson (2005); Misra and King (2005).

longterm partisan politics. The roles of these policy clusters for gender differences in labor force participation among families with minor children are examined. The extent of gendered work segregation in these clusters is explored, differentiating between segregation in terms of occupations but also in terms of total work, that is, homemaking as well as paid work. We analyze variation among countries in terms of gender wage gaps and glass ceilings and also examine difference in the quality of women's jobs in public and private sectors in a prototypical dual earner country. An analysis of differences among countries in the degree of women's representation in democratically elected position precedes the concluding discussion. Countries included here have all had uninterrupted political democracy after the end of the Second World War and more than one million inhabitants: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Themes, Findings and Controversies

Scholars pointing to perverse effects of welfare states on gender inequality have voiced several themes. An overarching theme has concerned effects on occupational segregation. Here the Nordic welfare states have been widely seen as having exceptionally high levels of gendered occupational segregation. In their landmark study on *Occupational Ghettos*, Charles and Grusky (2004:10) thus pose as one of their central puzzles: "Why are gender-egalitarian countries extremely segregated?" Labor economists have weighed the positive and negative effects of the provision of public day care and of parental leave programs for women's labor force participation and for gender differences in wage levels (Albrecht et al. 2003; Arulampalam et al. 2007; Datta Gupta et al. 2006; Booth 2006). While many authors agree that such programs can increase the presence of women in the labor force, they argue that such programs in practice have boomerang effects. Since parental leave is used primarily by mothers, repeated and long leaves can decrease women's work experience and other aspects of human capital, thereby widening wage gaps. Policies allowing women long periods of absence from work are likely to increase employers' statistical discrimination, making them especially reluctant to hire women for jobs requiring long experience and training leading to high-paying positions. On the assumption that women entering jobs on lower wage levels are likely to be less attracted to paid work, subsidized day care is seen as bringing into the workforce also those women who are least committed to market production. Such a lowering of selectivity in welfare states is expected to increase wage gaps at the bottom of the wage distribution.

In a series of informative papers, Blau and Kahn (1996, 2000, 2003) have analyzed gender differences in earnings, showing that wage gaps tend to be larger in the US than in most other countries. They find that cross-nationally the overall earnings inequality among men is positively correlated with the size of the gender wage gap, interpreting this pattern to reflect that wage setting involving broad-based collective bargaining tends to decrease total earnings differentials and to raise wage floors, thereby improving earnings of low-skilled women and decreasing wage gaps. In their perceptive study on gender wage gaps over the total wage distribution in Sweden and the US, Albrecht et al. (2003:146) define glass ceilings as "a phenomenon whereby women do quite well in the labor market up to a point after which there is an effective limit on their prospects". They show that in the 1990s, the Swedish gender wage gap increases gradually from the 10th to the 75th percentile but thereafter sharply accelerates up to the 95th percentile. In the US, however, while the gender gap in this period increases from the 10th to about the 50th percentile, thereafter it remains stable with some decrease at the top level. In line with their definition they interpret the data as indicating that in the 1990s there are glass ceilings in Sweden but not in the US. In their view, this glass ceiling reflects that Sweden's woman friendly policies create a work environment where "women may have strong incentives to enter the labor force but not to do so very intensively" (172). These authors also suggest that the relatively high wage floor in Sweden makes it very difficult for career-oriented women to hire household help or help with children, thereby

contributing to glass ceilings. Arulampalam et al. (2007:177) interpret their data to show a positive correlation between work-family policies and glass ceilings and that “the gender pay gap is higher at the top of the wage distribution in countries with generous family-friendly policies ...”

While viewing women’s increased labor force participation as a positive effect of welfare states, sociologists Mandel and Semyonov (2005: 951; cf also Mandel and Semyonov 2006) argue that the lower gender earnings-gaps observed in countries with woman-friendly welfare states is a result of their centralized forms of wage determination and not of their family policies. These policies have instead limited women’s occupational opportunities and earnings capacity, so that “other forms of gender inequality have become dominant in labor markets with high rates of female labor force participation.” They create not only occupational segregation but also occupational inequality by concentrating female employees into the large public sector providing female-typed jobs. Mandel and Semyonov (2005:952) claim that “the nature of these jobs and convenient work conditions available in the public sector do not appear to enhance the economic opportunities of women in terms of occupational positions and earnings. Rather they appear to reinforce women’s tendency to compromise on convenient working conditions in the female-typed jobs and to deter them from attaining high-paying positions”. In their view, “state interventions aimed at promoting the employment of mothers increase women’s economic activity, but at the cost of widening other dimensions of gender inequality” (965).

In a creative micro-level analysis focusing on gender wage differences, Mandel and Shalev (2006) pointed to interactions between gender and class resulting from the nesting of gender stratification within the system of class stratification and to complexities in the role of welfare states as employers for gender wage gaps. Generous welfare states decrease total gender earnings gaps in a society by reducing its overall class inequality as well as inequality within different classes. At the same time, however, gender policies facilitating women’s paid employment increase the gender gap by aggravating unequal gender representation between and within classes. Here the welfare state as an employer plays a major role. It attracts women by offering them female-typed low-paid jobs in education and social care work, jobs in which working-time can be adjusted to women’s domestic obligations. Thereby the public sector lowers the selectivity of working women and decreases their motivation to compete with men for highly paid positions. Mandel and Shalev (2006:11) include public-sector unskilled and semiskilled jobs in care and early child education with private sector jobs such as those in cleanup, sales, and restaurants into a “menial” job category. In their view “The Scandinavian experience demonstrates that when almost all women are in the labor force – including those with low skills and weak attachment to paid work who would otherwise have stayed home – the average women will be less well paid than in a setting where women’s entry to employment is more selective”. In a careful comparative analysis, Gornic and Jacobs (1998) have explored the role of welfare states and public sector employment for women’s relative earnings, pointing to partly similar problems. Gornic et al. (1998) show that policies supporting the employment of mothers with children under three are important for the continuity of women’s labor force participation.

Based on the Swedish Level of Living Surveys, a number of studies on gender inequality have been carried out. le Grand et al. (2001) found that average gender wage gaps in Sweden had markedly decreased from 1968 up to 1981 but thereafter largely stagnated. In both the public and private sectors, there had been a decline 1968-81 and thereafter some divergence between sectors up to 2000. These data sets have also been used for analyses of gender gaps in attainment of supervisory and managerial positions. Using job histories from 1965-1991 and controlling for human capital, establishment size, sector and industry, Hultin (2001) found that women are substantially more restricted in attaining supervisory positions, especially in the private sector. Women’s restrictions were however more marked at lower and intermediate white collar levels than at top levels.² Korpi and Stern (2004) analyzing the

² Cf also Hultin and Szulkin

postwar period, found that in the 1960s and 70s when female labor force expansion was fastest, promotion rates were higher for men, but with smaller differences in the 1950s and 1990s. Internal promotion was more favorable for women than external ones. The presence of small children delayed promotions for men as well as women (cf also Bihagen and Ohls 2006). In a comparative study, Wright, Baxter and Birkelund (1995) found that the gender gap in workplace authority was lowest in USA and Australia, followed by UK and Canada, thereafter Sweden and Norway well above Japan.³ In a study based on the European Community Household Panel, OECD (2002:95) reports under-representation of women in managerial positions in most countries but not major or systematic differences among them in terms of the gender policy categorization used here.

The above review indicates that there are some disagreements among scholars pointing to negative effects on gender equality of welfare state efforts to increase the labor force participation of women; yet among them we can discern important themes. Some of these assumed negative effects are likely to be present in all countries, for example, employers' statistical discrimination in employment and job assignments of women and the negative effects of work interruptions on women's work experience and other aspects of their human capital formation, but such effects are assumed to be more severe in countries where gender policies promote women's labor force participation. Other forms of the negative consequences are seen as limited to welfare states attempting to enhance women's participation in paid work. One such theme concerns the decrease in selectivity when almost all women are in paid work, something expected to lower women's average qualifications and job motivation. Although similar consequences have rarely been discussed in relation to the fact that almost all men have traditionally been in paid work, this concern need not be based on assumptions of gender essentialism in views on paid work; rather it may point to differences in socialization processes, where in many countries sizable proportions of women have been socialized into roles of homemakers rather than into paid employment. It can also refer to decreasing selectivity when a larger share of women with only low education is found in the labor force. Another key theme relates to potential negative consequences of the aggregation of employed women into the public sector, something expected to generate occupational segregation and to create female-typed jobs which are menial and have a low potential for job involvement. A complementary concern is that in countries strongly promoting women's paid work, it is more difficult for women to reach top positions because of scarcity of low-paid household help. By selection and/or by adjustment among women, woman-friendly welfare states are thus not only likely to negatively affect gender differences in earnings; their large public sectors are assumed to provide jobs which tend to limit women's opportunities and ambitions when it comes to attainment of qualified, well-paid and powerful positions.

Dimensions of Gender Policy Institutions

How are gender policies related to major types of gender inequalities in different countries? As noted above we here focus on two major areas of inequalities, that is, agency inequality and economic inequality in terms of individual earnings. Sen (1992) argues that in assessing the goodness of a social order we must consider not only manifest but also potential aspects of well-being. In his view freedom to choose is important and can be defined in terms of "alternative sets of accomplishments that we have the power to achieve" (34). Accomplishments or functionings can vary from such elementary things as being well nourished and in good health to complex achievements such as having self-respect and taking part in the life of the community. The capability to achieve functionings constitutes a person's real opportunities of freedom to have well-being. We will here focus on the labor market, central for distributive processes within a society. The capability of women as well as of men to actively participate as individual agents in these socio-economic stratification processes is

³ The percentage of the labor force in official managerial positions followed a reverse order, being about 10 percent in Sweden and Norway but about 16 percent in Australia and 14 percent in USA but only six percent in Japan.

likely to be of basic relevance in several key contexts, including the economy and representative democratic structures as well decision-making within the household.

Gender scholars have intensively debated factors favoring women's choice of paid rather than unpaid work, that is, their labor force participation. In this context typologies can serve as heuristic tools, in a first step for describing patterns of similarities and differences among countries, and, in a second step to explain causal processes likely to underlie differences in outcomes. The identification by Esping-Andersen (1990) of conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare states has long provided fruitful landmarks for orientation in overall discussions and analyses of welfare states. This typology has been very much used to describe differences among countries in terms of the extent to which they fit into the above three types. For descriptive purposes this typology is clearly a step forward from a categorization of countries in regional terms, such as Continental European, Anglophone, and Nordic countries. But since it is based on a mixture of causes, institutions and outcomes, this typology is of little help in causal analyses attempting to understand and to specify links between, on the one hand, driving forces and, on the other hand, outcomes in terms of variation in inequality with respect to gender or class. In this context, a more fruitful alternative is to focus on the structures of welfare state institutions as intervening variables between driving forces and policy outcomes. We thus have to examine the ways in which legislators and policy makers in particular contexts have differently structured relevant policy institutions and how differences in policy structures are linked to policy outcomes; such an approach is likely to improve our ability to explain variations in outcomes with respect to inequality.

In analyses of gendered policy institutions it is necessary to unpack policies broadly described as woman-friendly into separate policy measures likely to differ in terms of their goals and with respect to their consequences for choice of paid or unpaid work. The concept of "the male breadwinner model" was long used as a one-dimensional variable to indicate the degree to which public policies presume that the husband is the dominant earner within a family (Lewis 1992, 1997). By recognizing the central role of differences in labor force participation for gender inequality this concept was helpful (Kolberg 1991; Taylor-Gooby 1991; Shaver and Bradshaw 1995; Sainsbury 1996). Further work has extended the bases for such indicators (OECD 2001; Gornic and Meyers 2003). In this context it is however necessary to distinguish between gender policy institutions likely to support women's roles as home makers and those likely to strengthen their capacities to engage in paid work. What Pateman (1989) termed the Wollstonecraft's Dilemma points to the classical choice between unpaid and paid work still confronting women. The Wollstonecraft Dilemma implies a two-dimensional policy conception with respect to presumptions of women's agency reflected in the relative stress on unpaid versus paid work. Deducting ideal types from the structures of existing policies, Korpi (2000) outlined a two-dimensional typology of policy institutions relevant for gendered agency inequality. This typology has been elaborated by Ferrarini (2006) and is here updated and refined. Indicators for policy institutions are selected so as to reflect the multiple ways in which public policies for families can support women's care work at home or their participation in market work. In attempts to counteract gender inequality, especially the Anglophone but also several other countries have focused on the abolishment of legal discrimination against women, thereby extending women's liberties (O'Connor et al. 1999). Such efforts were important in the early stages of women's emancipation. Our hypothesis is that to explain present country differences in gender inequality it is most fruitful to focus on social rights, that is, on claim rights which citizens have in relation to central and local governments.

In Western countries, governments long left it to families and to markets to tackle issues related to care and women's roles without attempting to shape gender relations by developing public policies granting claim rights to citizens. Countries maintaining this default choice can be said to operate a *Market Oriented Model* for gender relations, relying primarily on private support produced by markets and kin.⁴ Other countries have come to use public policies to

⁴ For data describing the extent of employer provided daycare facilities etc cf OECD (2001).

support particular forms of gender relations; among these countries institutions have developed in two partly divergent lines. One line of development has generated gender-relevant policy structures giving prominence to support for women's unpaid work as home makers and carers. Like the male breadwinner model, this type of public policy largely accepts that the husband remains the main breadwinner. Its institutional characteristics presume that wives have the primary responsibility for reproductive work within the family and enter paid work primarily on a temporary basis as secondary earners; it is here referred to as the *Traditional Family Model*. Another line of development has generated institutions with policies tending to strengthen the capabilities of women, particularly mothers, to participate in paid work, that is, a *Dual Earner Model*.⁵ Such institutional structures encourage and enable continuous and extensive labor force participation of women by transferring significant parts of social care from the home to the public sector. In the above two-dimensional space, we can describe policy differences in terms of their goals as well as in terms of their strength.⁶ Here it is however necessary to consider that institutions are always embedded in wider social contexts of relevance for policy outcomes, contexts reflecting factors such as economic and labor market policies and citizens' attitudes, norms and values. Furthermore, gender relevant institutions are resultants of combined effects of many different and often contradictory forces, and we can not expect to find policy institutions identical to these ideal types. Existing policy configurations are alloys, not elements. As pointed out by Ferrarini (2006), in some countries we also find clearly contradictory policy patterns (cf also Hiilamo and Kangas 2007; Leira 2006).

As recognized by all comparativists, in this type of work it is often very difficult to find reliable and valid indicators for relevant aspects of social policy dimensions. In this context, especially the quality of available information on daycare services for pre-school children is problematic. From the point of view of enabling dual-earner families, daycare services should be affordable and ideally cover full days and whole working weeks for all children below school age. Unfortunately, however, to an extent often not fully realized in previous research, especially for daycare available data are often not fully comparable. One problem is the mixing of information to include both private market-based daycare services and those provided or subsidized by public moneys, a distinction of relevance for affordability and extent of variation in terms of quality of services.⁷ Another problem concerns differences between countries in terms of the duration and hours of care.⁸ In Continental European countries, daycare has long been organized primarily for the somewhat older pre-school children and on a part-time basis, intended primarily to complement caring work within the family. For example, many daycare units provide only half-day care, are closed on Wednesdays and do not offer lunches for the children, thus presuming the presence of a mother at home.⁹ Furthermore it is not always clear if available figures represent percentages of children actually attending or children with the right to claim services.¹⁰ For most Continental European countries published figures typically indicate very high service levels for children three years and older but rather low ones for children 0-2 years of age. In contrast, in the Nordic countries daycare services were largely developed to enable mothers' employment, and are typically provided on a full-day, full-week basis for all age groups. Such comparability problems are likely to be most serious with respect to daycare services for the somewhat older preschool children. We will here therefore use figures for daycare services

⁵ Lewis (2003) has here used the "adult worker" term.

⁶ Clearly in addition there are other policy dimensions that are of relevance, such as the distribution of child-care responsibilities between fathers and mothers.

⁷ Thus, for example, the extensive collection of information in Adema () and the four volumes of OECD "Babies and Bosses" have rather imprecise data on this distinction.

⁸ Fore informative analyses of differences among 12 countries in these respects see Gornic and Mayers (2003).

⁹ European Commission Network on Childcare 1996; Ostner 1993; Wiliarthy 2001.

¹⁰ Thus, for example, in 1989 in the German Federal Republic, 79 percent of children 3-6 years old had a guaranteed place in a public kindergarten but only 30 percent of 3-4 year old children had visited a kindergarten (European Commission 1998, 171).

for children three years and older as indicators of traditional family support, while only data on daycare services for the under-threes are used as indicators of dual earner policies.¹¹ Thereby we arrive at the following composition of variables to be used as bases for indicators.¹² Data refer to the situation around 2000.¹³

The *Traditional Family Support* variable is a weighted average of four indicators:

1. Cash child allowances to children (expressed as a percentage of a single workers' net wage at the level of industrial workers in the country during the relevant year)¹⁴ (Weight 1.0).
2. Public daycare services for somewhat older children (from three years up to school age, reflecting places available in relation to the number of children in the relevant age group) (Weight 1.0).
3. Home care allowance to a parent for care of children below school age. (Weight 0.5).¹⁵
4. Marriage subsidies via tax benefits to head of household with minor children and an economically non-active spouse¹⁶. (Weight 0.2).

Cash benefits to minor children is a form of family support which is neutral with respect to the labor force participation of spouses. Because of its low earnings replacement rates, the home care allowance tends to be chosen by the parent with the lowest earnings, most often the mother. The marriage subsidy (cf Montanari 1999) describes the difference in the net post-tax earnings between, on the one hand, a single person, and, on the other hand, a four-person family with two minor children and only one of the spouses economically active; this difference is expressed as a percentage of the net average wage of a single worker.

The *Dual Earner Support* variable is an unweighted average of two indicators¹⁷, namely

1. Public daycare services for the youngest children (0-2 years of age), indicating places available in relation to the number of children in the relevant age groups, and
2. Earnings-related parental insurance (a multiplicative variable reflecting percentage of replacement of previous earnings, duration of benefit, and coverage in the relevant population).¹⁸

¹¹ The effect of this limitation is that the strength of dual earner policies is underestimated in countries where day-care services for the 3-6 year old children are provided on a full week, full day basis. This would however not appear to be very serious, since countries with full day, full week care for the 3-6 year old children would also appear to have much higher service levels for the 0-2 year children than do countries with only part-time care for the somewhat older children. Needless to say, however, also short-hour daycare for 3-6 year olds can to some extent facilitate parental employment.

¹² Sources of information will be detailed in a revision of this paper.

¹³ For valuable help in developing the bases for these classifications we thank Tommy Ferrarini. In the following, replacement rates are calculated at the average wage level of industrial workers.

¹⁴ As a baseline for comparisons between countries and over time, we have here used the average wage of industrial workers, the primary relevant category for which comparable data are available.

¹⁵ These programs are sometimes also referred to as child care leave benefits.

¹⁶ The term "marriage subsidy" alludes to the term "marriage premium" used by economists to refer to the positive wage differences between married and single men. From the opposite perspective they can be described as tax penalties for secondary earners. Tax benefits include tax allowances (deductions in taxable income) as well as tax credits (deductions in taxes imposed) and are computed at average industrial worker wage levels. From an opposite perspective the marriage subsidy can be described as a tax penalty when a spouse enters paid work. Relevant in this context is also the distinction between joint or individual taxation of spouses not separately included here. By 2000 almost all of our countries had separate taxation.

¹⁷ Relevant here is also public support for the care of the elderly (Korpi 2000) to enable them to maintain their own independent households, thereby decreasing the reliance on care by daughters and daughters-in-law. Information on this indicators from all countries has however not been available.

This index reflects the extent to which public policies enable a shift of child care work from the family to the public sector, thereby enabling mothers to maintain a major and continuous occupational commitment. The provision of child care for the under-threes is here important.¹⁹ Central are also policies for earnings-related parental leave, encouraging young women to start and to maintain an occupational career while enabling parents to have an interlude for the care of infants.²⁰

By standardizing figures on the components of the above two variables (with the average set equal to zero and the standard deviation to unity) we can compare positions of different countries on these dimensions. Countries can be distributed in a two-dimensional space defined by the sums of values on traditional family support index and on the dual earner support index (Figure 1).²¹ This gives us three relatively clear-cut categories of countries. In the lower left corner, with negative values both in terms of traditional family support and of dual earner support, we find eight countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland,²² Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, and United States, forming a Market Oriented category of countries. With positive values on traditional Family support but low values on dual earner support, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands form a Traditional Family support cluster. Distinguished by the clearly highest values on dual earner support but also relatively high values in terms of traditional family support, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden form a Dual Earner cluster.²³

(Figure 1 about here)

In analyses of the role of policy institutions for gender inequality we must recall that such policy institutions are typically affected by conflicts among major societal actors and are imbedded in other structures of relevance for citizens' values and attitudes. Among major actors in this context we find not only political parties but also churches and women's movements working outside or within political parties. In many countries women's movements have been effective in changing public opinion and in placing new issues on the political agenda, thereby affecting decision-making within parties as well as in cabinets and parliaments. Yet, in the last stages of the formation of legislation relevant for gender inequality, political parties have continued to occupy key roles; parties do however differ greatly in the extent to which they have included women in decisive elected positions. In the Western countries parties have traditionally been related to the left-right continuum, revolving around issues broadly related to class inequality and political interventions into markets to affect such inequalities, a dimension along which conservative, centrist and left parties can be

¹⁸ Replacement rates refer to one year with one spouse receiving replacement at average production worker net wages while the other is absent from work.

¹⁹ Of relevance here are also the scheduling of hours within primary schools, which may facilitate or hinder parental employment (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997). Unfortunately such information is not available for all our countries.

²⁰ We have here not included lumpsum or flatrate, typically relatively low maternity benefits, which are not conditioned on previous earnings and are withdrawn if the mother becomes gainfully employed. Because of these marginal effects, parallel to the term "poverty trap" this type of benefit could be described as a "housewife trap."

²¹ Cf Appendix table 1 for standardized values on these indicators.

²² In an earlier version of these variables reflecting the situation in 1980-85, Ireland appeared as a marginal case between the traditional family support and the market oriented countries (Korpi 2000). The data used here do however put Ireland in the market oriented category.

²³ In the Nordic countries, traditional family support reflects primarily three factors. One is relatively generous child cash benefits which can be seen as neutral with respect to paid and unpaid work. The other is daycare facilities for older children, which if full-time and full-week support dual earner families but because of lack of detailed information are here placed as traditional family support (cf above). The third factor is the appearance of partly contradictory gender policies in these countries. Services for public home help to the elderly not included here.

roughly located.²⁴ In Europe, however, this left-right continuum has been markedly modified by confessional parties, most of them related to Catholicism but in some countries also to Protestantism. Claiming to constitute an alternative to capitalism as well as to socialism, Catholic confessional parties have attempted to situate themselves in intermediate positions on the center-right section of the political continuum. Central in their world view have been religiously motivated concerns for maintaining the traditional family as the moral basis for a good society. In European countries with proportional elections, confessional parties have often been able to form a third node beside secular center-right and left parties, their positions on the left-right continuum being significantly affected by the strength of party competition from the left. In the formation of gender policies, confessional parties, especially those with Catholic origins, have therefore tended to have a role that differentiates them from secular conservative-centrist parties.

The secular conservative-centrist parties have generally favored limitations of interventions into markets. Some of these parties have however supported policies strengthening the traditional family model in order to counteract falling birth rates seen as threats to the military and economic capacity of a nation (Pedersen 1993; Koven and Michel 1995; Wennemo 1994). Left parties have traditionally pressed for political interventions to counteract class inequality. During the last three decades of the twentieth century, primarily in Western Europe most of the left parties gradually came to support the dual earner policy model. In this processes at least in some countries women's movements associated with left parties have played a significant role (Hobson and Lindholm 1997).²⁵ In some countries, such as Sweden, also social liberal parties came to support policies of gender equality.

In discussing the role of political parties for the formation of gender policy models it is therefore fruitful to make a distinction between three major political tendencies, that is confessional parties, secular conservative-centrist parties, and left parties. Our hypothesis is that confessional parties have tended to support social norms, values, and policies in line with the traditional family policy model. Secular conservative-centrist parties are expected largely to have favored non-interventionism and market solutions, but in some of these countries we also find pro-natalist streams of thought. During the last decades of twentieth century, with some variation among countries, left parties gradually came to support the dual earner family model.

As noted above, any attempt to fit comparative typologies and developmental patterns to existing realities in a larger number of countries is bound to be confronted with exceptions and apparent anomalies.²⁶ Such exceptions and deviations from expectations provide interesting cases for the analysis of specific factors contributing to national trajectories in the development of institutions and policy outcomes. In discussing these exceptions, we run the risk of stressing specific attributes in each country, thus arriving at a seemingly full but yet unsystematic explanation of inter-country patterns of differences. In comparative analysis with a limited number of countries, all with their separate characteristics and specific histories, for countries deviating from overall patterns it is fruitful to point at constellations of factors which are likely to be of importance, constellations which can serve as hypotheses for further research.

According to the above combined indicator, the gender policy models identified in 2000 exist in the context of different types of dominant parties during the half-century after the end of the Second World War. With some significant exceptions and modifications, countries with the dual earner model are characterized by strong left parties, market oriented countries by secular center-right parties, and countries with traditional family support by confessional

²⁴ In some countries furthermore also ethnicity and language have been of significance in party formation, and in recent decades also environmental issues.

²⁵ For a debate on the role of women's movements in these contexts, see Louise A. Tilly (1997) and ensuing comments.

²⁶ For informative discussions of methodological problems in comparative analyses, see the Shalev symposium (Shalev 2006).

parties. In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, where left parties have had a relatively strong influence, we find a dominance for the dual earner policy model.²⁷ In this context it is fruitful to remember that countries with the dual earner model are also known to have wage setting institutions characterized by a high degree of centralization and industry-wide collective bargaining.

Countries having market oriented gender policies are more heterogeneous in terms of historical and other factors of relevance for gender equality. Five of the Anglophone countries, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, lack confessional parties and have electoral systems based on majority voting and two major parties. In the latter three countries, left parties have garnered sizable proportions of votes and have periodically formed cabinets, their short-term cabinet control did however not allow them to become agenda-setters in areas of social policy. Although Australia and New Zealand also lack confessional parties, they have partly different wage-setting institutions. Australia is known for its unique form of wage setting via legislated industrial relations commissions on federal and state level, commissions which played a central roles in wage setting up to the early 1990s (O'Connor *et al.* 1999:89). We will here take United States, Canada and the United Kingdom as something of "prototypical" market-oriented countries. In this context, Ireland is a special case. In Ireland political parties were formed in relation to positions taken in the struggle for independence from Britain up to the early 20th century. The Catholic Church in Ireland has long retained a very strong position, partly founded in its opposition to Protestant Britain (Whyte 1971).²⁸ Among countries with market oriented gender policies we also find Switzerland, where during the whole postwar periods confessional parties have been present in the near-permanent coalition cabinet, including all three types of parties. In the Swiss federal setting, the policy-making role of this cabinet is however strongly limited by independent cantons as well as by the frequent use of popular referenda (Immergut 1992; Huber and Stephens 2003). These impediments to policymaking have led to a market oriented model. In a much different context, such a gender policy model is also found in Japan, where a conservative-centrist party has dominated during the post-war period.

In six Continental European countries, that is, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and France, ranked here in terms of decreasing confessional party influence potential, we find the traditional family support model.²⁹ In Italy, the confessional party largely dominated cabinets during half a century after the end on the Second World War. Also Dutch postwar policies have been strongly influenced by confessional parties, with long periods of coalition cabinets with the medium-sized social democratic party. In Belgium and France partly anti-clerical liberal parties have been relatively influential. In France with weak

²⁷ A partial deviant here is Finland, where centrist-conservative parties have dominated postwar governments. Yet the relatively strong left, albeit long split between Communists and Social Democrats, has been represented primarily via the Social Democratic Party in long-term coalition governments with the centrist parties. Norway has a small protestant confessional party which has been influential in center-conservative coalition cabinets.

²⁸ In very strongly Catholic Ireland, it is difficult to single out a confessional party. What became the dominant party after independence, Fianna Fail, is here classified as secular conservative-centrist because when Ireland joined the European Union in 1973 ? this party associated with the conservative grouping in the European Parliament. The second largest party, Fine Gael, was associated with the Christian-Democratic parties and is here defined as confessional. In practice, however, both of these parties relatively closely followed view on gender relations promoted by the Catholic Church. Fine Gael has however only been in cabinet positions when in coalition with the small Labour Party.

²⁹ All of these countries have been characterized by coalition governments, in which left parties have participated relatively often. With the exception of Austria, in all of them confessional parties have had a longer government tenure than the left parties. In Germany the small liberal party (FDP) has participated as a coalition partner with the Social Democrats as well as with the confessional parties (CDU/CSU). In Ireland, where the dominant parties have their roots in the struggle for independence from Britain, Fianna Fáil as well as Fine Gale have traditionally had exceedingly close relations to the country's Catholic hierarchy (Whyte 1971). Based on the fact that after Ireland's entry into the European Union, only Fine Gale affiliated itself with the confessional group in the European parliament, it is here classified among the confessional parties.

confessional parties, conservative parties have traditionally been pro-natalist (Pedersen 1993). Among these countries, Austria has had the strongest social democratic party, with a long record of participation in single-party and coalition cabinets. In Germany a confessional coalition has been dominant, periodically in strong competition with social democrats.

Gendered Work Segregation

As noted above, work is a key concept in the study of gender inequality. Already when Adam delved and Eve spun, work was segregated between men and women. In analyses of inequality between women and men, it is fruitful to focus on the totality of work that is to be carried out in a society as well as on interrelations between different types of work.³⁰ The totality of work comprises not only paid but also unpaid work, not only production but also reproduction. Reproduction work includes social care of children and elderly as well as household maintenance (associated primarily with food and cleaning). Daly and Lewis (2000:285) view social care as “activities and relations involved in the meeting of the physical and emotional requirements of dependent adults and children, and the normative, economic and social frameworks within which these are assigned and carried out”. In this context the care infrastructure (in terms of services and cash) comes to the fore as do the ways in which care work is organized in a society in terms of relations between caregiver and receiver and the economic and social conditions under which caring takes place.

During the course of industrialization the patterning of gendered work segregation came to be characterized by two major types of differentiation. With respect to the totality of work, what can be described as primary work segregation gradually came to separate reproduction work largely remaining within the home from production work remunerated and carried out outside the home. The extent of primary work segregation is indicated by differences in labor force participation rates between men and women as well as in the extent to which women become homemakers, that is, stay outside the labor force to take care of family and home. Within production work, a form of secondary work segregation came to be reflected in an increasing specialization and differentiation of occupations with respect to tasks, status, and wages, that is, in occupational segregation. Research on gendered work segregation has largely been bifurcated with one stream focused on labor force participation and another on occupational segmentation. This bifurcation has been unfortunate and most analyses of occupational segregation have failed to simultaneously consider also primary work segregation, which often consigns sizable proportions of women to unpaid reproduction work within the home.

Primary Segregation: Labor Force Participation vs Homemaking

As is well known, since the end of the Second World War in our countries women’s labor force participation has greatly increased.³¹ During the last three decades of the 20th century, women’s increasing participation rates have markedly eroded gender gaps in labor force participation, a development somewhat strengthened when in the same period the previously very high participation rates of men showed some decrease. However, some significant variation among countries has remained. During the postwar period working class women came to have lower labor force participation rates than well educated women, which in all our countries now tend to have high and relatively similar participation rates. It is however likely that differences in gender policy models are more relevant for participation of working-class women.

Lacking good class indicators in most databases on labor market, we here take formal educational level as a proxy for class, and look at differences among countries in labor force

³⁰ The fruitfulness to consider the totality of work to be carried out in a society has been stressed by Montanari (199) and Glucksman (200?).

³¹ Although relevant, in this context we will not consider differences among countries in terms of part-time and temporary jobs.

participation rates in 2002 among women (25-64 years) at low, medium and high levels of formal education.³² Working-class women's participation rates show considerable differences among countries, with a range from only one third in Italy up to two thirds in Sweden. Countries with the dual earner gender policy institutions have the clearly highest levels with about 60 percent or above of women with low education in the labor force (Table 1).³³ In the prototypical market oriented countries, USA, Canada and UK, average participation rates are about ten percentage points lower. These rates are somewhat higher in Australia and New Zealand, but very low in Ireland. Among countries with traditional family policy institutions we see more variation, with participation rates among low-educated women close to 50 percent in Austria, Germany, and The Netherlands but higher in France and lower in Belgium and Italy. Although less pronounced, similar tendencies appear also among women with medium levels of education. With respect to women with tertiary education, excepting Japan, participation rates are uniformly much higher in all countries, approaching 90 percent in the dual earner countries and above 80 percent in the others. Japanese participation rates do not vary greatly by formal education.

(Table 1 about here)

The above pattern thus verifies the hypothesis of many scholars that countries with dual earner policies have reached their very high overall female participation rates largely by being less selective in the sense that they have drawn very large proportions of women with low education into the labor force. Dual earner countries thus have a larger proportion of women originating in working-class homes than what is found in countries with different gender policy institutions. This difference in the female labor force composition with respect to educational qualifications should be kept in mind in comparisons of gender wage gaps and mobility aspirations.

The continued relevance of gender policy institutions is evident when we examine how the presence of minor children in the family tends to affect gender gaps in labor force participation and the percentage of women identifying themselves as "home makers" (Table 2).³⁴ Among countries with the dual earner support, in families without minor children gender gaps in employment are quite small and appear absent in Finland and Sweden. Also in these countries, however, the presence of minor children is associated with some increase in gender gaps, in particular when there are two or more children in the family; yet the percentage of women who are primarily homemakers is limited to one-digit levels. In the absence of minor children our prototypical market oriented countries, USA, Canada and UK, have gender gaps not much higher than in the dual earner countries, but among the former the presence of one minor child markedly increases gender gaps, drastically so with two or more children in the family. The percentage of homemakers among women in these prototypical market oriented countries is considerably higher than in the dual earner countries. In the other market oriented countries, gender gaps in employment and levels of homemakers are very high in Australia and Ireland but somewhat less so in Switzerland and New Zealand. Their percentage of homemakers is considerably higher than in dual earner countries. Japan has a high primary gender participation gap. Among countries with traditional family support, in families with children France and Germany have gender gaps at about the same levels as Switzerland, but much lower proportions of homemakers. Austria roughly follows the German pattern, and The Netherlands is quite similar to Belgium. In contrast, Italy has a very large total gender gap as well as large gender gaps in families without children, gender gaps which increase considerably in the presence of children.

³² Data source OECD (2004: 306-310). Low, medium, and high levels of formal education defined as less than are secondary education, secondary education, and tertiary education.

³³ A description in terms of employment/population ratios result in a roughly similar pattern of differences.

³⁴ In most countries homemakers are self-defined in response to questions such as In a few countries (US, they are defined in the sense that they are persons in this age category not in employment, not seeking work, retired, or sick. Persons 25-64 years. Among men the percentage in this category is at the one-percent level and is disregarded here. For early analyses of the role of homemakers, cf Nermo 1997, 200?.

(Table 2 about here)

The continuous and strong increase in female labor force rates since the 1970s has thus weakened but not obliterated country differences in gender employment gaps. A clear pattern is that dual earner countries markedly differ from other institutional models. In comparison with the prototypical market oriented countries, they have lower proportions of homemakers and also lower employment gaps among families with children. These differences become more pronounced when we make comparisons with the other market oriented countries as well as those with traditional family support, especially with respect to Ireland, Australia, and Italy. The clearly highest proportions of homemakers appear in Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy.

Secondary Segregation: Occupations

After the end of the Second World War, gender differences in labor force participation rates have drastically declined and women's once great disadvantage in attaining higher education have largely disappeared or been turned into some advantage, yet occupational segregation persists with only a gradual long-term decline.³⁵ Social scientists have debated the causes and consequences of the persistence of such segregation.³⁶ In their study of occupational gender segregation, Charles and Grusky (2004) make a distinction between horizontal and vertical segregation. They argue that to a major extent horizontal segregation reflects what they refer to as "gender essentialism". This horizontal distinction is maintained because non-manual occupations are seen as embodying characteristics that are seen as prototypically female, for example, service and care orientations. In contrast they view vertical segregation as based on cultural forces maintaining the belief of male primacy, to the effect that men are more status worthy than women and therefore better suited for positions of authority and domination. Both these two types of segregation are seen as generated and maintained by largely similar cultural mechanisms involving employer discrimination, internalization of values and expected sanctions. In addition, horizontal segregation also involves internationalization of preferences while vertical segregation reflects labor force commitment (assumed to be lower among manual employees). As noted by Charles and Grusky, in most Western countries, horizontal gender segregation appears to be rather widely accepted and largely compatible with the logic of egalitarian policies. Crucial here is to what extent such segregation is associated with gender disadvantages in terms of conditions of work and differences in types of rewards associated with jobs, differences reflected in the nature of work, wage levels, and power.

Charles and Grusky argue that the longterm development of gender occupational segregation has been affected by the emergence of postindustrialism, which increased the size of tertiary sector and drew many women to areas such as services and communications. To fill positions in routine nonmanual jobs, employers had to attract increasing numbers of mothers and wives, in this process making work conditions increasingly family-friendly by reducing penalties for intermittent labor force participation and by enabling the combination of paid work with domestic duties. Such factors are likely to loom large in most countries. In the European context we must however consider additional factors, primarily partisan politics, which in Europe came to be of key relevance for women's labor force participation.

In the following we will examine the two partially different aspects of the extent of gendered work segregation discussed above. One aspect concerns occupational segregation, reflected in the distribution of employed men and women among 23 different occupational categories (cf Methodological Appendix). By including homemakers as an additional category in the bases for computing segregation indexes, we get an index reflecting total work segregation, that is, both occupational segregation among the employed and the differentiation between paid and unpaid work.

³⁵ Cf for USA cf Jacobs (1989). In Sweden Neremo 1997; Kumlin 2007.

³⁶ In this context, an often overlooked issue concerns potential differences in the definitions and delineations of jobs typical for men and women (Löfström ???).

In analyses of segregation, a much used measure has been the dissimilarity index, D, which can be interpreted as the percentage of men and women that would have to be removed from a data set to make for a perfect correspondence between the sex composition of each occupation and the entire labor force (Duncan and Duncan 1955). This index thus has an easy interpretation, but it is sensitive to the changes over time and to differences among countries in the size of occupational categories. To complement this dissimilarity measure, Charles and Grusky have developed an Index of Association, A, which is not sensitive to changes in the size of occupational categories. The value of A reflects the extent to which sex ratios within different categories of occupations deviate from the mean of such ratios calculated across all categories of occupations (Charles and Grusky 2004:42). The insensitivity of this index to the size of occupational categories must however be kept in mind when occupational categories with relatively few persons are included.

Examining the extent of occupational segregation in countries with different types of gender policy institutions, we find relatively muted differences (Table 3).³⁷ According to the dissimilarity index, D, differences among our countries are limited; half of them are found within a narrow band of values (46-48), namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands. A somewhat higher value appears in Finland, while the lowest ones are found in Italy, USA, France, and Austria. Index A shows a relatively similar pattern, with somewhat higher values in Finland, UK, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and again low values in France, Italy, Germany, and USA, now with Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium in between. While countries with dual earner institutions are found in the upper half of values on both indexes they are accompanied by several other countries. Considering both indexes the Nordic countries are relatively similar to UK, Ireland, and The Netherlands, and on D-index in addition also to Belgium, Germany and Switzerland.

(Table 3 about here)

Including homemakers among basic categories for estimating total work segregation, the dissimilarity index D shows the largest percentage point increases in Italy, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium with large shares of homemakers. The highest dissimilarity values (D) are now found in Ireland, Switzerland, and Finland, the lowest one in Italy while Denmark, Norway, and Sweden tend to cluster in the vicinity of UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and The Netherlands. Now index A shows its highest values in Ireland, Switzerland, UK, Norway, and Belgium. The lowest values are found in Italy, Germany, and France, while USA, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Finland, and The Netherlands appear in what could be described as a middling category.

The above data indicate that we find no clear-cut or broad difference in the extent of segregation among countries associated with different gender policy institution. While Denmark, Norway and Sweden with dual earner institutions tend to be found in the upper half of occupational segregation measures, they are often joined by UK, Ireland and The Netherlands. Here however Finland tends to have higher values than the three other dual earner countries. In terms of occupational segregation, Italy, France, and USA as well as Germany and Austria often have low values. Looking at total work segregation, relatively high figures again tend to appear in Ireland, Switzerland, Finland, Belgium and Germany, while we find the lowest values in USA and Italy. Here Denmark, Norway and Sweden are in a middling category including also UK, Belgium, Austria and The Netherlands. Both with respect to occupational and total work segregation, Italy, Germany, France with traditional family support and market oriented USA tend towards relatively low values while market oriented Ireland and Switzerland as well as Belgium with traditional family support have high figures. Contrary to what has often been assumed, dual earner Denmark, Norway and Sweden are thus not set apart from countries with other types of gender policy models. As noted by Charles and Grusky (2004: 71), Sweden appears to have middling levels of occupational

³⁷ For data sources cf Methodological Appendix.

segregation and earlier interpretations of is extreme segregation were partly misled by the mix of occupations tending to exaggerate values for Sweden.

Gender Wage Gaps and Glass Ceilings

Gender differences in material living standards are affected by the extent to which there is equal distribution of total income between household members. Yet, among persons in the labor force the relative level of earnings is an important indicator of inequality in status and economic outcomes. In all our countries, on the average women have lower wages than men. Labor economists and labor market sociologists have been engaged in the analysis of gender wage gaps (Blau and Kahn 1993, 2000, 2003; England 2005; le Grand 1997; le Grand et al 2001; Hultin 2001, Hultin and Szulkin 200?; Sundström; Löfström ...). Gender wage gaps are measured in terms of differences between men and women in earnings per time unit, usually hourly earnings, differences referred to as gross or unadjusted wage gaps.³⁸ As noted above, levels of earnings inequality are affected by forms of wage setting, where especially broad-based collective bargaining has tended to decrease gender wage gaps (Edin and Holmlund 1995; Streeck and Kenworthy 200? ; Crouch ...). Analysts have examined to what extent gender wage gaps reflect differences in observable factors such as education, occupation, or experience, and if direct gender discrimination as a residual factor is likely to be involved. While early interest was focused on average gender wage gaps, attention later turned to differences in wage gaps along the whole wage distribution. One major focus of research has been on possibilities of women to reach the very top levels of earnings, authority, and power, their disadvantages at the top level being interpreted to indicate the existence of glass ceilings.

The glass ceiling concept captures our imagination; at the same time it poses problems of causal interpretations. Baxter and Wright (2000) view the glass-ceiling hypothesis as implying not only that in their overall occupational achievements women face greater obstacles than men; it implies that there is a shift when women approach top levels of hierarchies related to income and to other factors, a shift increasing women's obstacles at the top reflected in larger wage gaps there than at middling and lower levels of hierarchies. As noted above, Albrecht *et al.* (2003:146) use a similar general definition of glass ceilings. The causal interpretation of observed differences in gender gaps at the top and at lower levels of earnings hierarchies is however problematic.

Problems for causal interpretation of observed gender wage gaps at the top arise since it is possible that factors driving the size of these gaps can differ not only in strength but also in quality at different levels of the wage distribution. In particular, institutions for wage setting and forms of collective bargaining are likely to be much more relevant at low and medium levels of the wage distribution than at top levels, where individual bargaining becomes prominent. Most analysts appear to have interpreted a larger wage gap at the top relative to the median as a result of specific factors generating a steep uphill climb for women approaching high levels of earnings. An alternative interpretation suggests that the larger gender wage gap at the top has instead emerged by a decline of earnings gaps at low and medium levels of the wage distribution. At these lower levels of the distribution, wage setting involving broad-based collective bargaining may have succeeded in decreasing wage gaps not by improving women's individual upward wage mobility but by collective bargaining raising the wage floor on which most of them stand. Some analysts have used the difference between the levels of gender gaps at the 90th and 50th percentiles as indicators of glass ceilings (for example, Arulampalam et al. 2007). While this is an acceptable descriptive measure, its causal interpretation is thus problematic. Before we make causal interpretations of observed gender gaps in terms of specific difficulties for women at the top of the total wage distribution, we

³⁸ Apart from possible gender discrimination, differences in wage levels are affected by gender differences in factors such as education, experience, age, occupation. It is therefore of interest to examine not only raw or gross wage gaps in earnings, but also adjusted or net wage gaps after adjustment for some human capital or other potentially relevant factors.

must therefore examine processes generating changes at medium and lower levels of this distribution.

We here look at gross wage gaps between women and men in hourly earnings covering most of our countries around 1998, using OECD data for all employees at the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles (Table 4).³⁹ Beginning by examining wage gaps at median levels, we find the largest gaps in USA, Ireland, Canada, United Kingdom and Switzerland with the market oriented gender policy model as well as in Austria with traditional family support. In a middling category we find Finland, Norway, and Sweden with the dual earner model together with The Netherlands, Germany, and New Zealand. The clearly lowest gaps appear in France, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark as well as in Australia. As others have observed, the Nordic countries have middling or low average gender wage gaps.

(Table 4 about here)

Searching for possible glass ceilings we focus at the 80th percentile, where we do not find systematic differences among countries with different gender policy models. The largest gender gaps are found in UK, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Austria and Germany. Medium wage gaps appear in Canada, Sweden, The Netherlands, Ireland, New Zealand and Australia. The lowest gaps appear in France, Italy, Belgium and Denmark. At this top level, the dual earner countries thus show much variation with respect to wage gaps.

Comparing gender gaps over the entire earnings distribution, we find similarities of interest. The four dual earner countries together with Australia and New Zealand are the only ones showing tendencies to continuous increases in wage gaps when we move from the 20th over the 50th and up to 80th percentiles of the earnings distributions. Among these countries, the male earnings advantage over women is thus highest at the top level. As discussed above, we must consider alternative causal processes before taking the 90-50 percentile difference in wage gaps as an indicator for glass ceilings in terms of specific causes counteracting women's wage increases at top levels. For these countries it appears reasonable to search for alternative explanations in wage setting institutions driving up women's wages at medium and low wages levels, thereby decreasing gender wage gaps. For this purpose we need data over a long period of time to examine changes in wages gaps at different wage levels. Such long-term data are readily available for Sweden.

Historical evidence shows that in Sweden since the 1960s and up to the early 1980s the "wage policy of solidarity" by workers' trade unions effectively contributed to raise the floor for the lowest wage earners, thereby markedly decreasing women's wages. In this period unions also made special efforts to increase low wages among women (Lundborg ???; Edin and Holmlund 1995).⁴⁰ Women's wages were also improved in the context of increasing labor demand (Edin and Richardsson 200?). This increase in demand was primarily generated by the political decision to expand public sector social services. In Sweden, from 1968 over 1974 to 1991, while wage gaps markedly decreased at low and medium wage levels, they remained relatively stable at the very top (*Figure 2*)⁴¹. Similar wage setting efforts were also made in the other three Nordic countries.⁴² As noted above, in Australia wages were long set by public industrial relations commissions on federal and state levels, courts which played a central role up to the early 1990s. In this period the courts relied on a concept of "equal worth" to decrease gender earnings differentials (O'Connor *et al.* 1999:89). Belgium, France and Italy deviate from all others by having very small gender gaps at all three earnings levels.

³⁹ This information on raw or unadjusted wage differences is valuable since it covers most of our countries. Data here include full and part-time employees.

⁴⁰ These efforts included specifications of wage increases in absolute rather than in percentage terms and wage guarantees in the case of "wage drift".

⁴¹ Above the 90th percentile, data for 1981 differ somewhat from the other years (cf also Albrecht *et al.* 2003:154).

⁴² Studies of the long-term development of disposable household income in Finland, Norway, and Sweden show that inequality tended to decrease from the late 1960s and early 1970s to reach low levels before beginning to climb again in the late 1980s (ref??).

Greatest earnings differentials at 20th percentile appear in UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria and Germany.

(Figure 2 about here)

The above data thus indicate that in terms of differences in gross gender wage ratios at the top level, the four dual earner countries do not clearly deviate from other countries with different gender policy institutions. Instead, the dual earner countries together with Australia and New Zealand form a rather distinct category by having relatively low earnings gaps tending to increase from the 20th over the 50th up to the 80th percentile. It appears likely that this pattern has been significantly affected by wage setting institutions and specific policy measures.

Women's Jobs in Public and Private Sectors

As discussed above, several scholars expecting negative consequences for gender equality of policies to enhance women's employment opportunities appear to imply that in comparison with other available job alternatives, in the dual earner countries work environments and jobs in the public sector tend to impair work involvement and career ambitions of women and to conserve them in passivity. This line of thinking appears, for example, when Mandel and Semyonov (2006:952) state that public sector jobs and convenient work conditions are not likely to enhance the economic opportunities of women with respect to occupational positions and earnings; instead they reinforce women's tendency to compromise on convenient working conditions in female-typed jobs and to deter them from attempting to reach high-paying positions. The characterization of the bulk of these jobs as "menial", a term having synonyms such as unskilled, tedious, boring, or basic, would appear to imply that such public sector jobs will have various forms of negative consequences for women. Such a view on job consequences runs parallel to the long debates within the sociology of work on the effects of different kinds of jobs on workers' personalities and activities. Here sociologists and psychologists have discussed consequences which the nature of a worker's job tends to have at the job as well as off the job. The long arm of the job has been seen as having important "spill-over effects" into non-work spheres of life (Meissner 1961; Wilensky 1960). Scholars have analyzed the role of work in areas such as values, off-the-job activity, intellectual flexibility, and mental wellbeing (Kohn 1969, Kohn and Schooler 1983; Schooler et al. 2004).

Given the widely spread views on the negative consequences for women of public sector work in the dual earner countries, it is surprising that little if any empirical data have been offered as empirical support for such interpretations; instead these views may have been informed by analysts' informal observations and perceptions of social care practices. Here it must be recalled that countries vary greatly in the ways in which social care work is organized and carried out as well as in terms of the formal competence of staff. As noted above, in the Nordic countries a major part of social care jobs have emerged in the public sector since the 1960s and have generally relatively high requirements for formal education and good working conditions. In most other countries, the major part of social care work performed in the Nordic public sectors is carried out by homemakers or in the informal and market sectors, where educational requirements and job conditions often tend to be lower.⁴³ In this context one relevant comparison is between women in public and private sectors in dual earner countries. Since Sweden is often seen as the prototypical case of public sector services for social care, we here examine data on differences in job quality among women in its public and private sectors. Survey data refer to 2004-05 and come from a probability sample of the Swedish population (20-44 years).

In sociology of work, the concept of "work orientation" has long been used to describe the types of rewards workers can derive from work. The main distinction is here made between

⁴³ According to Gornic and Mayers (2003: 220-223) center-based staff educational qualifications vary greatly among countries. In the US, 30 states none have no requirements and in the UK more than half have no formal training. In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden three to three and a half years of university training are required.

extrinsic rewards, primarily money, and intrinsic rewards referring to satisfaction derived from performing work tasks and work roles (Goldthorpe *et al.* 1968; Korpi 1978). In this survey, work orientations were tapped by three questions:

1. Which one of these statements fits best with what you think about the job you now have. A) This job is like all other jobs. One does what one has to, but the only thing that means something is the wage, or B) There is something special with this job. Besides the wage it also gives me a sense of personal satisfaction.
2. Is your job monotonous? (Yes, No)
3. Is your job such that you have great possibilities to learn new things? (Yes, No).

Positive responses are here defined for question 1 as alternative B, question 2 No, and question 3 Yes. In Table 5, the distribution of respondent choosing the positive response alternative on these three questions are given separately for women in private and in public sectors, with controls for class and skill levels.

(Table 5 about here)

Results indicate that as expected the quality of women's jobs is clearly related to class and to skills, being lowest among unskilled workers. Differences in job quality between public and private sectors with class and skill held constant are however not what many would have expected. Looking at proportions of women with an intrinsic work orientation, among unskilled as well as skilled workers figures are clearly higher in the public sector than in private sector jobs. In the three levels of middle-class jobs, differences between sectors are more muted but show no tendency to be higher in private sector jobs. When it comes to monotonous jobs, among unskilled and skilled workers the same pattern in positive responses are again marked and in favor of the public sector. In middle-class jobs, differences between sectors are smaller but on the whole not to the disadvantage of the public sector. The extent to which the job offers great opportunities to learning does not differ systematically between sectors.

The fears voiced by many that in comparison with equal grades of private sectors jobs, those in the public sector tend to induce lower work commitment and to have lower job quality are thus not supported by data for Sweden.⁴⁴ It can also be noted that among workers in its public sector about one half is classified as skilled against only about one fifth in the private sector. In the middle class, public sector jobs are more skewed towards middle and higher ranks than are those in the private sector.

Women in Positions of Political Power

As discussed above, equal participation of men and women in decision-making within representative democratic organs is an important indicator of agency equality. Several scholars have feared that the types of jobs and work environments found in the public sectors of dual earner welfare states will stifle women capabilities and ambitions to achieve powerful positions. The processes and mechanisms within public sectors assumed to generate these disadvantages for women are of such a broad nature that we can expect them to have consequences for women's advancement also in other hierarchies of power, including elected organs of representative democratic government. Although advancement in the context of elected democratic organs is decided by fellow citizens rather than through selection by superiors as in private business, positions in both sectors require that women themselves are willing not only to accept them but also to compete with others, men as well as women, to achieve them. Within democratically elected organs, legislatures and cabinets offer peak positions, and we will follow women's representation at these levels in the early 1990s and up

⁴⁴ The Swedish figures are to be compared with data from Norway.

to the mid-2000. Here it should be noted that differences in electoral models have been relevant for female advancement, with proportional elections providing easier access for women than do majoritarian electoral models. Among our countries somewhat different forms of majoritarian electoral models were found in USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Japan, France (after 1958), and New Zealand (before 1996). The other eleven countries have had proportional elections, the most common form being party lists of candidates. In countries with proportional elections, left parties have tended to promote somewhat more women than other types of parties (Korpi 2000).

In legislatures in 1950 as well as up to 1970, in our 18 countries women were nearly excluded; the average share of women was only about five percent, only slightly higher in the four Nordic countries (Table 6). Up to this point electoral institutions were of minor significance. After 1970, however, the walls of these male citadels began to erode, the speed of erosion differing among countries in ways reflecting partisan politics as well as electoral institutions. In 1990, the dual earner Nordic countries clearly deviated from all other countries. With proportional elections and relatively strong left parties, they had increased women's representation in legislatures to around one third of seats, while in the other countries women had at best only one fifth of seats. Up to 2005, women's legislative representation increased slightly from high levels in the Nordic countries, and Sweden approached a near-equal gender representation. Among European countries with strong confessional parties and proportional elections, women's representation was considerably lower. Thus in Austria, Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands women had about one third of legislative seats while especially Ireland and Italy remained laggards. In countries with majoritarian elections and a dominance of secular center-conservative parties, in 2005 women had about one fifth of legislative seats, with the lowest shares in Japan, France, and USA. It can be noted that by introducing a proportional electoral system in 1996, New Zealand markedly increased its female parliamentary representation.

(Table 6 about here)

Reflecting the earlier near-absence of women in legislatures, up to 1970 practically only men held the levers of cabinet power in our countries. In the early 1990s, however, we find considerable improvements for women in cabinet representation, especially in Nordic countries with the dual earner gender policy model. By that time women held about 40 percent of cabinet seats in Finland, Norway and Sweden with a somewhat lower level in Denmark. In the period 2003-05, among the Nordic countries high female cabinet representation continued in Finland and Norway; in the Swedish cabinet during these years women held half of cabinet posts. In Denmark however, women's cabinet representation remained at a lower level. Among European countries with proportional elections and traditional family support policies, up to 2005 Italy continued with exceedingly low women's cabinet representation. Some progress was however made in The Netherlands, and Belgium, considerably so in Austria and Germany. Among countries with market oriented gender policies and proportional elections we find only limited progress in Switzerland and Ireland. This is also the case for Japan, Australia, and the United States while under similar conditions somewhat more progress was made in the United Kingdom. After the shift to proportional elections, also New Zealand raised its female cabinet representation.

The above figures should calm some of the apprehensions among several scholars that the jobs and work environments in public sectors of dual earner countries will tend to widen other major aspects of gender inequalities, including women's attainment of positions of power and prestige. Here it can be noted that in the Nordic countries with decentralized government and representative bodies at both communal and regional levels with the right to tax citizens, the large numbers of elected positions at these lower levels have been important as preparation grounds for top-level political offices. Women's representation at these lower levels has roughly increased in parallel to that in legislatures.

Gender, Class, and Gender Inequality

Long experience tells us that policies designed to achieve particular purposes may fail and have unintended and undesired consequences. Policies attempting to decrease gender inequalities – entrenched during centuries – are bound to run into problems. Scholarly debates on these policies are therefore to be welcomed, and critics of dual earner policies have made a fruitful contribution by bringing key issues into the debate. While such a critical stance generally is to be applauded, as indicted above, parts of the arguments advanced in this context are problematic. These problems have to do with insufficient empirical backing for interpretations made, limitations in comparisons of policy outcomes between countries with different gender policy models, and the near absence of consideration of the relevance of class inequality for gender inequality.

As shown here, dual earner countries have been considerably more successful in integrating women with working class backgrounds into the labor force than have countries with market oriented or traditional family policies. Critics have seen this as a “lack of selectivity” involving risks for bringing in less qualified women with a lower commitment to paid work. But once women grow up expecting to have a job as much as to have children, such worries may be exaggerated. From an egalitarian perspective, this broadening of the selection to include more working-class women appears as a major achievement, and as decreasing both class and gender inequality. Hadas and Shalev deserve credit for explicitly bringing in class into their comparative analysis but they appear to miss its relevance when they interpret the negative correlation between a country’s total income inequality and the relative proportion of women in the bottom and top quintiles of the earnings distribution as effects of dual earner policies decreasing women’s motivation to compete for lucrative positions and of increased employer statistical discrimination. An alternative interpretation is that this negative association to a large extent reflects the greater prevalence of employed women with low education in the dual earner countries than what is the case, for example, in Italy.

Critics are right in pointing to risks in dual earner countries for employer statistical discrimination and to difficulties for women’s human capital accumulation when women more often than men stay out of work or work part-time in connection with childbirth. Their interpretation that such risks are higher in dual earner countries than in those with other types of gender policies have however not been documented. In countries with dual earner policies, it is relatively easy to find good and affordable child care and most women have full-time or long part-time jobs.⁴⁵ As shown above, mothers with minor children in these countries tend to remain in the labor force to a considerably higher extent than do women in the context of traditional family support or market oriented gender policies. In the latter countries, the combination of often short part-time work, longer interruptions in connection of childbirth, and difficulties in finding good child care are likely to have even more severe negative consequences for women’s possibilities to accumulate experience and to improve wages in relation to men. Our data indicate that at low and medium wage levels, dual earner countries tend to have considerably smaller gender wage gaps than have market oriented countries and those with traditional family support.⁴⁶ In achieving these relatively low gender wage gaps, significant roles are likely to have been played by the combined efforts of unions to upgrade low wages and of left parties as the main political force to develop gender policies enabling women to take paid work and to expand the public social service sector providing the bulk of women’s jobs. Mandel and Semyonov (2005) argue that in this context the causal factor was wage policy rather than gender policy. This is however an irrelevant issue; gender policies as well as wage policies were both central parts of a political agenda driven in tandem between left parties and, at that time, strong union movements. As parts of these efforts, women have been significant actors in bringing about a decrease in gender wage gaps relevant for a majority of women as well as in an overall decrease of income inequality. This is an important indication of interrelations between gender and class inequality.

⁴⁵ (Montanari 2004). Most part-time is 26+ hours per week, minimizing very short part-time.

⁴⁶ Here Australia and New Zealand are parallels. The overall very low gender wage gaps in Belgium and Italy are likely to have different explanations.

While dual earner policies have succeeded in decreasing gender inequalities relevant for a clear majority of women, the question remains how these policies have affected women's chances to reach elite levels in terms of power and prestige. Relevant in this context are positions in the private economy as well as in representative democratic structures. Critics of the dual earner model have focused on problems for women in the private sector to reach the very top of economic power structures. As discussed above Albrecht *et al.* argue that at the very top of the wage distribution in Sweden there is a glass ceiling hindering women's progress; they suggest that here the lack of cheap maid services are important. The interpretation of the existence of such a glass ceiling is however largely invalidated by their oversight to consider consequences of the primarily politically generated major decline of gender wage gaps among the great majority of employees at lower wage levels. This does however not exclude the possibility that at the very top of the power structures in the business world, women's representation is lower in Sweden than in the US. It would be desirable to have similar studies of gender wage gaps on very top from more countries with different gender policy models. The general hypotheses put forth by several scholars that dual earner policies soften the will of women to attain powerful and prestigious positions does however not square with a major fact: since the 1970s women in the dual earner countries have succeeded in penetrating the echelons of political power up to very top positions. A study of the sex composition of Swedish elites in eight different areas indicates that business elite had a much smaller proportion of women than what was the case with other elites, and that while between 1989 and 2001 there was a considerable increase of women in the other elites, this increase was very modest within the business world (Göransson 2006: Chap. 1).⁴⁷ The relative lack of women at the very top of the business elite need not reflect a weakness of motivation among women; it can also be the result of resistance by male elites largely insulated from political influences. To decrease such resistance, Norway has legislated gender quotas in the composition of boards of governance in major business establishments.

Among feminists, views differ on the desirability of fulltime childcare for mothers. Experiences in the dual-earner countries during the past few decades indicate that when women have the option to take paid work, over time the proportion of homemakers tends to shrink. Such a development decreases total work segregation and tends to empower women, making them willing and able to compete for powerful positions. In other policy contexts, women often have to make a choice between motherhood and occupation, something resulting in considerably higher proportions of mothers as fulltime homemakers or only marginally attached to the labor force. The dual earner model tends to enable women to combine work and family; it also appears to be associated with positive effects on fertility rates (Björklund 2007).

Dual earner countries have long had an undeserved reputation for having extremely segregated occupational structures. As pointed out by Charles and Grusky and shown here, their occupational segregation is probably not worse than in many other countries. Bad as this may be, it appears that horizontal job segregation is widely accepted and compatible with egalitarianism, at least as long as sex-segregated occupations do not have lower quality or lower wages as comparable jobs. Experience shows, however, that the equality of earnings requirement in this equation is very often far from satisfied. In all countries, on the average women typically have lower earnings than men in jobs with similar qualification requirements. It is a poor consolation that in this respect problems appear to be less acute in the dual earner countries.

Critics of dual earner policies have bypassed a potentially serious problem: the possibility that that in the dual earner countries, at least under some circumstances, pressures on women in the public sector may increase more than on those in the private sector. An example here is Sweden, which suffered a severe depression in the early 1990s, when the long postwar period of full employment was replaced by mass unemployment at two-digit levels. In combination

⁴⁷ The eight areas studied were business, politics, interest organizations, mass media, culture, the Church of Sweden and the sciences.

with the political run-up to fulfill requirements for the coming of the European Monetary Union, serious restrictions were placed on the public budget. In combination, these restrictions led to a massive shedding of personnel in the public as well as in the private sectors. Since the demand for social care services certainly did not decrease, in the public sector the remaining personnel had to face greater strain. Surveys indicate that in the 1990s, the prevalence of negative stress increased more among women in the social care sector than among women in the private retail sector.⁴⁸ Although there were only minor increases in gender wage gaps in the public sectors, in this period both men and women in the public sector saw their wages fall behind those in the private sector.⁴⁹

The above analyses point to a dualism between economic power and democratic power and to the relations between class inequality and gender inequality. The suggestion that a decrease of gender wage gaps at the very top economic level requires that women at this level have access to cheap maid services suggests that gender equality at the very top can best be achieved through widening class inequality at the bottom by increasing the number of working-class women willing to accept such jobs. Such an alternative is now well underway in several Western countries, where an increasing flow of immigrant women from the poor countries form what has been referred to as an international chain of care to take such jobs in the rich countries (e.g. Crompton 2006). The dual earner model offers a much more complex alternative, that is, to transform men into fathers to the extent that they accept an increased role in the care of their own children. In the context of relatively general parental leave benefits as well as affordable and good public child care, such tendencies are discernable in the dual earner countries but they are still only at a beginning.

After *Paradise Lost*, Milton wrote a sequel, *Paradise Regained*. The above discussion does not imply that a Nordic Gender Paradise has existed or will come to existence. But as Dante proposed long ago, also in *Inferno* there are more or less eligible circles. In our search for more eligibility, the experiences in the Nordic countries deserve a proper evaluation.

⁴⁸ Negative stress (Karasek and Theorell 1990) is defined as a combination of strenuous work not allowing the individual to determine work pace (le Grand, Ryszard Szulkin and Michael Thålin 2001. "Har jobben blivit bättre?" Pp. 79- 120 in *Välfärd och arbete in arbetslöshetens årtionde*, edited by Johan Fritzell, Michael Gähler and Olle Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU 2001:53).

⁴⁹ le Grand, Ryszard Szulkin and Michael Thålin 2001. "Lönestrukturens förändring i Sverige." Pp. 121-173 in *Välfärd och arbete in arbetslöshetens årtionde*, edited by Johan Fritzell, Michael Gähler and Olle Lundberg. Stockholm: SOU (2001:53). Wages were standardized for education and experience.

Methodological Appendix (Incomplete)Work segregation

For the majority of countries segregation indexes are based on EU-SILC of 2004 from EUROSTAT (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy). For Germany and the Netherlands we used the EU Labour Force Survey. For Switzerland 2002 and USA 2000 data come from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and for UK 1997 from Luxembourg Employment study (LES).

The occupations have been coded according to the *ISCO-88* code (two-digit level). We merged the three categories of managers (11-13) into one category and skilled agricultural and fishery workers (61) together with agricultural, fishery and related labourers (92) into one category, to have the following categories:

11-13	Managers
21	Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals
22	Life science and health professionals
23	Teaching professionals
24	Other professionals
31	Physical and engineering science associate professionals
32	Life science and health associate professionals
33	Teaching associate professionals
34	Other associate professionals
41	Office clerks
42	Customer services clerks
51	Personal and protective services workers
52	Models, salespersons and demonstrators
61+92	Agricultural, fishery and related workers and labourers
71	Extraction and building trade workers
72	Metal, machinery and related trades workers
73	Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers
74	Other craft and related trades workers
81	Stationary-plant and related operators
82	Machine operators and assemblers
83	Drivers and mobile plant operators
91	Sales and services elementary occupations
93	Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport

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Figure 1 Three Institutional Models of Gender Policy in 18 Countries in 2000





Figure 2 Gender Wage Gaps in Sweden 1968, 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2000 Across the Total Wage Distribution (log hourly wage)



Source: Swedish Level of Living Surveys

Table 1 Labor Force Participation Rates among Women (25-64 years) by Type of Gender Policy Institutions and Educational Attainment (2002).

Type of Gender Policy	Country	Education*		
		Low	Medium	High
Dual Earner Support	Denmark	56	81	88
	Finland	62	79	88
	Norway	59	80	89
	Sweden	65	83	88
Market Oriented	USA	50	72	80
	Canada	49	74	82
	United Kingdom	51	76	87
	Australia	55	68	81
	New Zealand	57	75	79
	Ireland	40	67	84
	Switzerland	(64)	(76)	(85)
	Japan	56	63	67
Traditional Family Support	Austria	51	70	84
	Belgium	40	69	83
	France	57	76	84
	Germany	50	71	83
	Italy	35	68	83
	Netherlands	47	74	84

* Low = Less than secondary education, Medium = Upper secondary education, High = Tertiary education

Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2004:306-309.

Table 2 Gender Gaps in Employment by Presence of Minor Children and Homemakers among Women by Types of Gender Policy institutions in 2000 (%)

Types of Gender Policy Institutions	Country	No. of Children				Home-makers
		Total	0	1	2+	
Dual Earner Support	Denmark	7.7	7.7	3.5	12.9	2.3
	Finland	7.0	0.1	11.8	19.7	6.7
	Norway	7.1	5.9			6.5
	Sweden	4.1	-0.4	9.8	9.4	5.8
Market Oriented	USA	14.8	7.2	17.4	29.0	13.3
	Canada	11.8	6.0	14.9	23.6	
	United Kingdom	14.4	5.4	17.1	28.2	10.2
	Australia	20.0	16.1	33.3	47.5	
	New Zealand	17.0	5.7	20.2	30.9	
	Ireland	29.0	14.1	33.2	43.2	25.0
	Switzerland	18.5	9.4	19.7	32.5	20.9
	Japan	31.6				
Traditional Family Support	Austria	16.2	10.5	18.5	29.0	19.0
	Belgium	20.1	17.4	23.5	24.7	14.8
	France	17.7	9.6	18.7	32.9	9.7
	Germany	16.3	7.2	21.5	35.6	12.9
	Italy	33.9	26.2	40.9	49.9	23.5
	Netherlands	21.4	15.6	24.3	30.8	12.8

Table 3 Occupational Segregation and Total Work Segregation by Types of Gender Policy Institutions.

(D = Index of Dissimilarity; A = Charles - Grusky index of Association)

Types of Gender Policy Institutions	Country	Occupational Segregation		Total Work Segregation	
		D	A	D	A
Dual Earner Support	Denmark	48	5.1	49	5.6
	Finland	52	5.6	54	5.8
	Norway	48	5.2	50	6.0
	Sweden	48	5.2	49	5.3
Market Oriented	USA	41	4.2	45	5.1
	Canada				
	United Kingdom	46	5.5	49	6.3
	Australia				
	New Zealand				
	Ireland	48	5.4	57	6.9
	Switzerland	48	4.5	55	6.2
Traditional Family Support	Japan				
	Austria	44	4.6	50	5.7
	Belgium	47	4.8	52	6.0
	France	44	3.2	48	4.6
	Germany	48	4.1	51	4.5
	Italy	36	3.5	46	4.4
	Netherlands	47	5.4	48	5.8

Table 4 Gross Gender Wage Gaps in Hourly Earnings by Type of Gender Policy Models (20-64 years) in 1998.*

Type of Gender Policy Institutions	Country	Percentiles		
		20	50	80
Dual Earner Support	Denmark	5	8	12
	Finland	8	13	23
	Norway	13	14	22
	Sweden	9	12	19
Market Oriented	USA	18	24	22
	Canada	19	22	19
	United Kingdom	21	21	24
	Australia	4	10	15
	New Zealand	7	13	17
	Ireland	25	24	18
	Switzerland	23	20	23
	Japan			
Traditional Family Support	Austria	24	21	20
	Belgium	9	7	8
	France	10	17	9
	Germany	22	17	20
	Italy	9	7	7
	Netherlands	14	13	19

* Australia, Canada and Sweden for 2000, New Zealand and Switzerland for 2001 and United States for 1991.

Source: OECD (2002), Employment Outlook 2002:97.

Table 5 Work Orientations and Job Quality Among Women in Sweden's Private and Public Sectors 2004-05.

Class	Skill Level	Sector	Intrinsic Work Orientation	Job Not Monotonous	Great Opportunities To Learn	n
Working Class	Unskilled	Private	58	58	47	244
		Public	74	69	47	129
	Skilled	Private	71	75	69	57
		Public	86	86	61	160
Middle Class	Lower	Private	78	78	71	197
		Public	78	73	75	45
	Middle	Private	82	92	79	184
		Public	91	96	84	203
	High	Private	88	97	92	85
		Public	91	95	91	108

Source: SCB ULF.

Table 6. Representation of Women in Legislatures and in Cabinets by Type of Gender Policy Institutions.

Type of Gender Policy Institutions	Country	Women in Legislatures		Women in Cabinets	
		1990	2005	1991-94	2003-05
Dual Earner Support	Denmark	33	37	26	29
	Finland	39	38	40	41
	Norway	36	38	44	44
	Sweden	38	47	36	50
Market Oriented	USA	6	15	14	17
	Canada	14	21	17	23
	United Kingdom	8	20	6	26
	Australia	12	28	6	16
	New Zealand	18	32	16	27
	Ireland	8	14	10	18
	Switzerland	13	25	6	19
	Japan	6	11	5	15
Traditional Family Support	Austria	15	31	12	40
	Belgium	10	36	15	21
	France	6	14	13	21
	Germany	14	30	20	42
	Italy	11	16	6	7
	Netherlands	21	34	22	31